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Encountering Resistance:
Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice
Eric J. Millert

[A] free government . [is that] wherin they who are greatest ... are not elevated
above their brethren... [and] walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to
1
freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration.

I. INTRODUCTION
Police officers are executive agents empowered by the state to use
physical force to coerce recalcitrant individuals to comply with public
laws and other lawful directives. While this is not all they do, it may be
their most distinctive feature. 2 The police power to interfere with
civilians and coerce compliance with law enforcement directives is,
however, limited by law 3-including constitutional law.4 And one core
way in which the United States Constitution limits police power is by
granting civilians the right, under certain circumstances, to contest or
resist5 police interference, both in the courtroom and on the street.
Contesting policing may be protected by the Constitution, but
(because of the police power to use force) in practice it is a deeply risky

t Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I am hugely indebted to my colleague,
Alexandra Natapoff for her extensive feedback and similarly so to Song Richardson, Alice
Ristroph, Marcy Strauss, and Priscilla Ocen, as well as the participants in the Seventh Annual
Southwest Criminal Law Workshop: Carissa Hessick, Alex Kreit, Meghan Ryan, Ben Levin, Beth
Colgan, Dan Epp, lon Meyn, Shima Baradaran-Baughman, and Jack Chin. I am also deeply
grateful to the participants in the Legal Forum symposium, to the editorial staff of the journal for
their work and comments, and to John Rappaport for all his help.
' John Milton, The Readie & Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, in
AREOPAGITICA AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN MILTON 414, 421-22 (1999).
2 See, e.g., EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE IN MODERN
SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF
BACKGROUND FACTORS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 39 (1970) ("[Tlhe police

are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in
society[.]").
'

See,

e.g.,

JEROME H.

SKOLNICK,

JUSTICE WITHOUT

TRIAL:

LAW

ENFORCEMENT IN

DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 3-6 (4th. ed., 2011) (1970) (discussing the way in which the rule of law
limits justifications for police activity).
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, & VI (including the rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, to silence during interrogations, and to have counsel present at certain
stages of the investigatory and adversary process).
I treat the terms as equivalents, along with "challenge," "not comply," "disobey," and so on.

295

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

296

[2016

business. 6 A number of recent incidents have highlighted ways in which
police demands for compliance escalated into fatal seizures of unarmed
African Americans.7 As a result, local, state, and federal governments
have begun to investigate ways to curtail and control police use of force,
primarily by considering new, less forcible styles of policing. 8
Mitigating the police power to use force should not be a
government's only consideration even when developing practices to
reign in police violence. In particular, legislators or police
superintendents should not lose sight of core democratic and
constitutional norms. The public should not face the cruel dilemma of
forgoing their rights or facing harsh treatment from the police.
fall
will
choice
cruel
that
predictably,
since,
Especially
disproportionately on those who are economically disadvantaged and
socially marginalized, often on the basis of race or mental health.
The dilemma is all the more cruel because the United States
Constitution not only entrenches rights to resist the police, but also
requires civilians to resist policing precisely as the means of asserting
those rights. 9 The right to decline a police encounter,10 or police officer's
request to search," or police officer's demand to answer questions on
the street1 2 or at the front door, 13 or during an interrogation1 4 requires
the public to refuse to comply by walking away,15 or remaining silent,1 6
or calling for a lawyer.1 7 To fail to take these non-compliant measures
negates those rights.
These constitutionalized rights and requirements to resist policing
reflect more general democratic values. Mature democracies are both
participatory and contestatory, providing their citizens with, not only a
voice in the decision-making process, but also the ability to demand a
response from public officials, whether legislators, judges, or members
6

JEROME SKOLNICK, JUSTICE ON TRIAL 196-97 (2d ed. 1975).

Steve Mills et al., Laquan McDonald Police Reports Differ Dramatically from Video, CHI.
TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2015, 1:25 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/locallbreaking/ct-laquanmcdonald-chicago-police-reports-met-20151204-story.html [https://perma.cc/UDM5-ETRS/].
8 See, e.g., OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE].

9 See infra Section III.B.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002).
" See id.
12
See, e.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (holding a civilian may decline to answer
certain questions and go about her business).
13
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
14
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10

15
16

See, e.g., Delgado, 466 U.S. 210.
See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. 436.

17

See, e.g., id.
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of the executive branch.18 Democracy, on this view, is a reciprocal
process of public participation in government decision-making, rather
than a unilateral imposition of the governor's determinations upon the
governed. 19 Different democracies may create different ways of
including and responding to the public in the policy-making process.
But in America, at least, the public is (constitutionally) entitled to
contest policing as it happens, on the street, within legally prescribed
limits.
The failure to resist or a lack of conflict during an encounter or
interrogation need not mean that the police are acting lawfully or in a
non-authoritarian manner. Certainly, conflict-free and consensual
policing precludes some egregious practices associated with the use of
force. But as we know from decades of scholarship on Miranda waivers
and consent searches, procedurally sophisticated police may undermine
civilians' rights in nefarious ways, sometimes without the civilians even
realizing it.20 In other words, law enforcement can use psychological
strategies to promote peaceful or conflict-free policing that nonetheless
undercut core constitutional values to contest or resist policing. Worse,
individuals may unwittingly accept or endorse the ways in which the
police undermine those interests, thereby magnifying the democratic
injury.
In Section II, I shall analyze some familiar features of Fourth
Amendment doctrine on the laws of search, seizure, and interrogation
to reveal that our constitutional law of criminal procedure entrenches
certain rights to resist policing. Constitutional doctrine presupposes
conflict as the way in which the public must assert those rights to be
free from police interference. If civilians do not resist policing, they
waive their rights to be free from police interference. Absent resistance,
the police are free to engage in all sorts of behavior that encroaches on
the public's ability to go about their business undisturbed. So long as
the police do not seize the civilian, they may pose questions without
limitation, or follow the civilian around, or otherwise badger him. So
long as the police obtain consent, they may search anywhere within the
scope of that consent. Upon arrest, the police may seek to expand the
scope of a lawful search or detention, or engage in probing custodial
interrogations. And the police are, it turns out, psychologically
sophisticated in badgering the public, obtaining consent, expanding the
scope of their legally authorized investigation, and inducing suspects to
talk. Preventing these types of police activity requires the civilian to

'8
19

See infra Section III.
See infra Section II.B.

see RICHARD A.

LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 128-31 (2008).
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contest policing by ending the encounter, withholding consent, or
asserting her right to silence.
In Section III, I shall demonstrate that these constitutional rules
reflect important features of modern democracies. One of those features
is the value of contestation (in addition to the usual emphasis on
participation). Minimizing contestation thus has important, negative
effects upon democracy. In particular, contestation is one way in which
we hold the state and its agents responsible, by ensuring that the state
provides justifications for its activities. Without the ability to demand
justifications from the state or its officials, we cannot force them to
defend the legal and political propriety of their conduct.
In Section IV, I shall suggest that theories of policing that ignore
contestation fail to honor important constitutional and democratic
values. I shall take as my stalking horse one popular, contemporary
theory of policing that is currently emerging as a leading solution to the
problem of excessive uses of force: proceduraljustice. Procedural justice
is a theory rooted in political psychology and sociology that emphasizes
the value of compliance and cooperation with the police. It seeks to
mitigate the amount of egregious violence the police use, primarily by
demonstrating how a variety of conflict-avoiding techniques are more
effective than the use of force in procuring civilian compliance with
police directives during an encounter. These techniques include
encouraging civilians to talk to the police during an encounter. But
while procedural justice has confronted the issue of police violence, it
has turned its back on the ways in which the constitution requires the
public to contest policing or forgo their rights. Indeed, I shall argue,
some of the techniques endorsed by procedural justice are the very
techniques used by the police to procure waivers of rights and to reveal
private information in ways that, when force is not at issue, we
normally reject as end-runs around the Constitution.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTRENCHED RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
The police are powerful. Videos of police killings and beatings of
African American men 21 and women 22 have highlighted one aspect of
police power: the ability to deploy physical force to overpower the

21
See, e.g., Damien Cave & Rochelle Oliver, The Videos That Are Putting Race and Policing
into Sharp Relief, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/
us/police-videos-race.html?_r=0.
22
See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw et al., Say Her Name: Resisting Police Brutality Against
Black Women, (African American Policy Forum, New York, N.Y.), May 2015, http://staticl.
squarespace.com/static/53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/560cO68ee4b0af26f72741df/1443628686535/
AAPFSMNBriefFull-singles-min.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG53-N7Q2].
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people they encounter, wherever they encounter them. 23 Whether the
police interact with people on the street or in a schoolroom, 24 by a
swimming pool 25 or in a car, 26 even in a jail cell, 27 law enforcement
authorities have at their disposal a variety of tools and techniques for
using overwhelming physical force to wrestle, hit, strangle, 28 tase, 29 or
shoot3 0 individuals who do not follow their orders, or whom they deem
to be a threat.
Police encounters are where the public engages most often and
most profoundly with the police. These encounters can take a variety of
forms, from the benign to the fatal. Encounters occur when passersby
ask the police for directions or victims call 911; when a member of the
public enters a police station to register a complaint; when an ill or
injured person asks the police to call an ambulance; when the police
order a jaywalker onto the sidewalk; 31 or stop and frisk a suspect on the
street; 32 or give a driver a speeding ticket; 33 or arrest a pan-handler for
selling single cigarettes; 34 or shoot a fleeing felon. 35
Police encounters have received bad press since Terry v. Ohio, 3 6 but
especially so in light of extremely violent police tactics deployed in a
"

Samuel Walker suggests that police use of force imposes both the most "visible injustices in

the criminal justice system," and ones that are the "most inflammatory." SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE

AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME, DRUGS, AND COMMUNITIES 318, 323 Figure 12.1 (7th ed. 2014). Egon
Bittner famously concluded that "the police are nothing else than a mechanism for the distribution
of situationally justified force in society." BITTNER, supra note 2, at 39; see also Rachel A. Harmon,
When is Police Violence Justified, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119 (2008).
24

Alan Blinder, Ben Fields, South Carolina Deputy, Fired Over Student Arrest, N.Y. TIMES

(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/29/us/south-carolina-deputy-ben-fields-fired.
html? r=0.
25 Caroline Bankoff, Texas Cop Suspended Over Disturbing Pool-Party
Arrest Footage,
NYMAG.COM (Jun. 7, 2015), http: lnymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/texas-cop-suspendedover-pool-party-footage.html [https://perma.cc/QCE4-AWGN].
2
David Montgomery, Sandra Bland Was Threatened with Taser, Police
Video Shows,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2015, at A12.
27 See generally Williams Crenshaw et al.,
supra note 22.
" See Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man's Death After Chokehold Raises Old Issue for
the Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014, at Al.
29 David Montgomery, Texas Trooper Who Arrested Sandra Bland Is Charged With Perjury,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2016, at A12.
" Frances Robles & Julie Bosman, Autopsy Shows Michael Brown Was Struch at Least 6
Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2014, at Al.
" Sandhya Somashekhar et al., Inconsistency the only Constant with Evidence in Michael
Brown Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inconsistencythe-only-constant-with-evidence-in-michael-brown-case/2014/11/25/6e3bc702-7450- 11e4-bdlb03009bd3e984_story.html [https://perma.cclWD7C-CH4Y].
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3

EPP ET AL., PULLED OVER: How POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 5 (2014).

Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner's Death, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2015, at Al.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
28
392 U.S. 1 (1968).

300

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

variety of encounters with unarmed African Americans. 37 Even the
mildest encounter can escalate quickly and for many reasons, both good
and bad. A police officer, while chit-chatting with a member of the
public, may notice that the civilian possesses a weapon and is acting
erratically, and correctly concludes that the civilian poses a threat to
the community. The officer may try to reason with the suspect, and
"talk" them into custody to ensure her own safety and the safety of
others. In response, the individual's behavior may become directly
threatening to the officer or some bystander. And in response to that
threat, the officer may resort to some kind of physical force, such as
using pepper spray or a taser, to subdue and disarm the civilian. Here,
the use of force may be necessary or justified to ensure public order or
produce compliance with the law or the officer's directives. If the
civilian responds to the less lethal force in unpredictable ways, then the
officer may resort to deadly force, and wound or kill the suspect. This
sort of escalation can be quite hectic and occur extremely rapidly. 38
The police exercise power over the public when they bring the
machinery of the state to bear upon people through citations, arrests,
and criminal prosecutions. Of all the ways in which the police may
legally exercise power over a civilian, the police have most power when
making an arrest. An arrest alters a civilian's legal status by
extinguishing her legal right to walk away, 39 to refuse consent to a
seizure or certain types of searches,4 0 or even to resist that amount of
physical force the police reasonably deem necessary to ensure
compliance with their directives. 41 This sort of police power can have
devastating physical, practical, and penal consequences, along with
extremely harsh collateral civil consequences. 4 2 For example, even

37 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 23, at 323 ("The most important strategy for improving
police-citizen encounters is to reduce police use of deadly force and use of excessive physical
force.").
3 It may also be skewed by the effects of implicit bias and stereotype threat on the police
officer and the individual she encounters. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the
Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1147 (2012). For the most part, I shall leave these
additional complicating factors aside.
" California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 636 (1991).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). The police may conduct an evidentiary
search of an arrestee's person as an incident of arrest, but cannot go beyond the scope of that
search without probable cause to search elsewhere. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344
(2009) (limiting searches, even searches incident to arrest, to the evidentiary basis justifying the
search).
[Inn some jurisdictions ... a person has the right to resist an unlawful arrest without
4
incurring criminal liability. Where this rule applies, a person may use such reasonable force as is
necessary to resist an unlawful arrest." 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 50 (2015).
42
By which I mean the non-penal, regulatory consequences put in motion by police activity.
Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programsand the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 875
(2015).
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when an arrest does not result in a prosecution, the process itself may
be highly punitive, 43 resulting in embarrassment, 44 stigma, stress, and
time in jail awaiting trial spent away from family or work. 45 At the very
least, an arrest creates a quasi-criminal record that increases the
likelihood that law enforcement will treat subsequent contacts with the
arrestee more seriously. 46 But arrests are also an important first step
along the path to charging, conviction, and sentencing. The police often
play an important role at each of these stages.
The police officer's legal ability to interfere with individuals is an
exceptional one. For the most part, the police have the same legal
powers and permissions as the rest of us. 4 7 Normally, the police lack
the legal power to enforce their will over the public. 48 Police officers
cannot just choose to interfere with some individual on a whim. 49 They
may only deploy their powers to interfere with individuals if they have
some special legal reason for doing so. Because they usually lack special
permission to interfere with members of the public, an individual can
usually treat any police officer she might chance to meet on the street
the way she would treat any other stranger.50 It is up to the individual
to determine whether she interacts with the officer, and how she
chooses to do so.
True, the reasons the police have to interfere with the public may
outstrip those that the rest of us have. The police have special legal
reasons to interfere if they suspect some individual of crimes or if that

a

Id. at 902-03.

4

EPP ET AL., supra note 33, at 1-3.

1

See, e.g., MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1992).

See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects Of Crime And IncarcerationIn New York City
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1551, 1595 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Neighborhood,
Crime, and Incarcerationin New York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2004).
4 They may have mostly the same physical powers too. Civilians can carry pepper spray,
46

Tasers, and weapons in many states.
4 Justice Harlan certainly thought so. In Terry v. Ohio, the Justice emphasized the equal

standing of both police and civilian when the police lack evidence the civilian has engaged in
criminal activity. That is, "in the absence of state authority, policemen have no more right to 'pat
down' the outer clothing of passers-by, or of persons to whom they address casual questions, than
does any other citizen. . . . [T]he officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an

encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a
person he considers dangerous. If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a

person for his own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his presence.
That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by every citizen) to address questions
to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator
and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection." Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
49 See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979) (rejecting "unfettered discretion" of
police to stop and search individuals suspected of criminal activity).
0 The police are particularly well-armed strangers. But, given the laws on concealed carrying
of weapons in many states, that need not distinguish the police from other denizens of those
communities.
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individual threatens public order.5 1 But when members of the public go
about their everyday business, without committing crimes or
undermining public order, the police lack these special legal reasons,
and so lack the power to interfere. To reiterate: the usual baseline,
whenever the police happen to encounter the public, is that the
individual encountered has the liberty to refuse to help the police or to
be helped by them. 52
But even when the baseline changes-when a police officer does
have the legal authority to stop or arrest someone-the civilian is not
completely devoid of rights. The right to challenge a police officer's
decision to stop, search, or question is entrenched in the Constitution.
Often, law enforcement officials request or require that civilians comply
or cooperate with their directives, and often those directives seek to
expand the nature and scope of authorized police activity. The Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments provide civilians with the power to
decline to comply or cooperate with government officials by ending an
encounter, refusing consent to a search, remaining silent when
questioned by the police, and even demanding the presence of an
attorney during custodial interrogation. 5 3
In fact, challenging the police is not just a constitutional right: it is
the way in which we assert our legal rights against the government in
the context of policing. The Court, in cases like Florida v. Bostick,54
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,5 5 and Salinas v. Texas, 56 tells us that
refusing to comply or cooperate with police authority is not just the
primary way to assert our Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. It is
the only way: these constitutional rights are the right to walk away,5 7 to
refuse to consent,5 8 and to decline to speak. 59 The choice is to insist
upon those rights or to waive them.6 0 If a civilian does not challenge the
police, if she complies with police questioning, then the Court treats

" In particular, they have a duty to interfere with us, and to aid in satisfying that duty, they
have certain powers to detain, question, and search those whom they have sufficient evidence to
suspect of having committed a crime, and certain other powers to help those they believe may be
in need of assistance.
52 Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
" The Constitution even provides civilians with a First Amendment right to criticize the
state or the police.
501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178-79 (2013).
7 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Terry, 392 U.S. at 33-34 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).

8 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
' Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
* This is true in general. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1996). It is
certainly true in the three areas I am concerned to discuss.
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compliance as consent or cooperation, and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment's protections do not kick in. Acquiescence, compliance, or
cooperation vitiates the protections provided by the Constitution.
A.

Contested Seizures

Our constitutional criminal procedure presupposes conflict as the
way people assert their rights. Only by resisting the police-by
(depending on your perspective) refusing to comply or cooperate,
disobeying, engaging in conflict, and other equivalent terms-can
individuals preserve a variety of constitutionally entrenched
protections against state power during criminal investigations (and
other interactions with law enforcement).
Legally permissible ways to resist the police are enshrined in a
series of constitutional rights. 61 Those rights to resist exist even when
the police have lawful authority to stop, arrest, or otherwise seize or
detain some civilian. 62
Those rights do not extend to a civilian's unlawful attempts to
evade seizure by fight or flight. 63 Civilians may engage in various forms
of physical resistance, some of them violent and directed against police
officers. Such resistance makes it hard and even dangerous for the
police to effectuate a seizure. In such cases, the law permits a certain
amount of force, proportionate to the crime and the danger inherent in
the situation, to subdue the civilian's attempts to resist the stop or
arrest. But while we may often think of resistance to police in terms of
unlawful fight or flight, there is another range of ways to resist the
police that are lawful. These lawful challenges to police authority do
not present a direct physical threat to the police, but do operate to limit
police control over the civilian.
The quintessential Fourth Amendment seizure is the arrest:
arrests have the dual feature of empowering the police to undertake
certain other actions, including restraining the suspect and using force
to overcome her physical resistance, 64 and of negating the suspect's
right to resist being taken into custody.6 5 Arrests are not the only legal
circumstance in which the police may use force: for example, the police
61

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, & VI.

62 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (holding that the right to counsel and to avoid self
incrimination apply in the context of custodial detention following arrest).
6
See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing use of deadly force to seize a
fleeing suspect); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985);
see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (fleeing from police in high crime area is sufficient
to establish probable cause to seize).
64
See, e.g., John Gardner, Justification Under Authority, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 71,
90 (2010).
"

See id. at 90-91.

304

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

may engage in brief custodial stops, during which time they may use
force to detain the suspect.6 6 Arrests are, however, the central
circumstance in which force is permissible: where the police officer has
some justification for physically interfering with the civilian, the
civilian can no longer demand to be free from physical constraint or
reasonable amounts of force used to effectuate that constraint.67
But even an arrest is not some magic talisman, unleashing the full
repressive force of the state upon recalcitrant civilians. There are limits
to the extent to which arrests empower the police to compel compliance,
and disempower the civilian's ability to refuse to comply or cooperate.
Even under arrest, civilians retain some rights to resist policing.
Although the arrested civilian no longer retains the same control over
her freedom of movement or security from searches as she might when
not in police custody, she is nonetheless free to refuse to aid the police
in their investigation, 68 and may resist police attempts to have her
cooperate, for example by refusing to consent to certain types of
searches beyond the scope of the arrest, or to provide incriminating
information. And what goes for arrests also goes for lesser seizures,
such as investigatory stops.
It is easy to overlook these rights of lawful resistance to police
activity. 69 And it is especially easy to do so if we are primarily focused
upon the ways in which the law permits the police to stop, arrest, and
search, and the fact that the police can often lawfully use force to back
up that permission. It is not the case, however, that the police may
always legally use force to back up their directives, even when they
have the power to stop, arrest, or search.7 0

6

See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

67

See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY

208-11 (1965); Frank J. Remington, LaFave on Arrest and the Three Decades that Have Followed,
1993 U. ILL. L. REV., 315--21 (1993). The use of force to constrain a civilian is not a forgone
conclusion: the decision to use such constraint is in the officer's discretion; and the amount of force
used should be (though legally need not be) the least necessary to effect a seizure. See, e.g.,
Gardner, supra note 64 (arguing that force used during arrest must be proportional to crime and
resistance).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6
61 In part, that may be because of a different baseline, an empirical or political one that
entertains "the expectation that [the police] may and will use force." EGON BITTNER, THE
FUNCTIONS OF POLICE IN MODERN SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF BACKGROUND FACTORS, CURRENT
PRACTICES, AND POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 38 (1970).
7o For example, the Christopher Commission, established in the wake of another police
assault on an unarmed African American-Rodney King in 1991-sought to restrict the use of
force: "An officer may resort to force only where he or she faces a credible threat, and then may use
only the minimum amount necessary to control the suspect." David S. Cohen, Official Oppression:
A Historical Analysis of Low-Level Police Abuse and a Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM.

HUMAN RTS L. REV. 165, 168 (1996) (quoting INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T,
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT ix (1991)).
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It is nonetheless true that certain types of resistance may
permissibly be met with some degree of force. 71 And it is sadly true that
the police use force even if the civilian's resistance is only verbal or
simply non-cooperative, 72 and even if some form of verbal or noncooperative resistance is required to assert one's rights (to limit the
scope of the search; to refuse to provide evidence or lengthen the
temporal scope of the search by speaking with the officer; to get the
officer off your porch; and so on). Sadder yet, the police too often, in
practice,
counter
legally permissible
resistance with
legally
74
73
risk
inherent
in
many
encounters.
force.
And
this
is
a
impermissible
Given these considerations, an officer's predeterminationto seize a
civilian, forcibly if necessary, and to sort out the mess at the station or
in the courtroom 7 5 tolerates serious harm to the civilian, 76 often quite
predictably on the basis of race.7 7 For example, one officer (citing the
criticism police officers received after the killing of adi unarmed African
American, Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri) opined:
[H]ere is the bottom line: if you don't want to get shot, tased,
pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to the ground,
just do what I tell you. Don't argue with me, don't call me

7
See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) ("Where the officer has probable cause
to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others,

it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.").
72 John Kavanagh, The Occurrenceof Resisting Arrest in Arrest Encounters:A Study
of Police-

Citizen Violence, 22 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16, 25-26 (1997) (suggesting that police violence is linked to
resisting arrest, and that resisting arrest includes "the arrestee refusing to stop and talk to the

officer").
1

See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, OrganizationalCulture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 453, 494 (2004) (discussing culture of police brutality as a feature of police
organizations); Harmon, supra note 23, at 1121 (recounting some infamous cases in which the
police used excessive force, and arguing that the Court provides insufficient guidance to regulate

such instances).
7 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, Sandra Bland and the "Lawful Order" Problem, WASH. POST (July 23,
2015),

https: //www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/sandra-bland-and-

the-lawful-order-problem/ [https://perma.cc/CDL4-JBHK]; see also Eric J. Miller, Police
Encounters with Race and Gender, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 735, 750-53 (2015) (discussing features
that might ratchet up the likelihood that the officer will use force to terminate an encounter).
a See, e.g., Jason L. Riley, Bratton Pushes Back, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 13, 2014),
http: //www.wsj.com/articles/political-diary-bratton-pushes-back- 1407964138
[https://perma.cc/7CHD-6835] (quoting New York Police Commissioner William Bratton, who
stated, "you must submit to arrest. You cannot resist ... The place to argue your case is in the
court, not in the street.").
7 See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing use of deadly force to effectuate an
arrest); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
7 L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons from Social Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2961, 2972 (2015) ("[R]acial violence is inevitable and overdetermined even in the absence of
conscious racial animus[.]").
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names, don't tell me that I can't stop you .. . My field stops last
minutes. How difficult is it to cooperate for that long?78
In these cases, officers may believe that the street is no place to
contest a seizure, even when such contestation is lawful. Where all that
is involved is a brief stop, for example, an officer may assume that it is
the civilian's civic duty to comply. 79 And officers may be more insistent
upon exercising their control over civilians when they have
predetermined they will stop certain groups or act to further certain
policies. Perhaps the most familiar of these predetermined searches are
"investigatory stops,"80 where the police officer has decided to engage in
a search for evidence of crime-often drug crime-before embarking on
her encounter with the public. The officer already intends an outcomethe officer will search the civilian-and probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or consent is simply a means by which to obtain such a
search.8 1
The core problem with predetermined investigatory activity is that
it is unilateral rather than reciprocal. 82 In a unilateral interference, the
officer is not interested in responding to the concerns or information
raised by the civilian she interferes with. Instead, the officer seeks to
achieve a particular investigatory goal-to search the person or
property of the civilian she encounters. The officer's goal is to achieve
physical or psychological control over the civilian for as long as it takes
to engage in the investigation. The purpose of a unilateral interference

Sunil Dutta, I'm a Cop. If You Don't Want to Get Hurt, Don't Challenge Me, WASH. POST
(Aug. 19, 2014), https:I/www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-youdont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/ [https://perma.cc/QG9B-5MM9].
7
Joseph Grano, for example, argued that the public has a general duty to cooperate with the
police during investigatory encounters. See Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense:
A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 497-500 (1984). Grano
believed that, in return for the benefits of membership in a political community, each member has
a duty "to make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the community's efforts to solve and control
crime." Id. at 497. That duty includes the requirement that individuals submit to police
investigation, including searches and arrests, so long as the police have some individualized
grounds to suspect the individual has committed a crime. Grano's claim is that the interests of the
police and the larger community (and so its individual members) are aligned. Given that
alignment, civilians should submit to a variety of interferences with their liberty and security,
including detention or arrest, "interrogation, a face or voice lineup, sampling blood or hair, or
taking fingerprints." Id. at 496. These sacrifices are a cost of policing: "Of course, the sacrifice may
be unpleasant, especially if the individual is exonerated, but in evaluating the reasonableness of
the police conduct, we should not ignore the individual's obligation to the community's cooperative
enterprise." Id. at 500.
80 EPP ET AL., supra note 33. Epp establishes that the investigatory stop targets both groups
on the basis of a policy (drug interdiction) and race. See id. at 5-6, 33-35.
8 See id. at 36-40 (discussing a training manual for making investigatory stops, which
includes tactics to ensure that the officer gets to search the car that is the target of her
investigation).
82
I discuss the democratic value of reciprocity, infra Section III.
78
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is thus to gain access to some space or person. In contrast, the purpose
of a reciprocal encounter is to determine what sort of action is
necessary, and whether further investigation is needed or warranted,
including finding that it is not. In a reciprocal encounter, the police
officer is willing to step back, de-escalate, or even forgo compliance or
cooperation when the evidence or the civilian's behavior does not merit
the sort of drastic intervention that policing-particularly investigatory
policing-often entails.8 3
Policing routinely raises the conflict between maintaining control
and respecting the rights of civilians. 84 On the one hand, the police are
in the business of order-maintenance: they are expected to establish, by
force if necessary, control over the circumstances they encounter on the
street.85 On the other hand, the police are expected to conduct
themselves according to the rule of law, and are sworn to uphold the
rights of the civilians they encounter.8 6 These two aspects of the police
role-law and order-often find themselves in tension.8 7 For example,
an officer who proposes to take control of an unruly individual or group
may have to separate the individual or group from other bystanders
and control the disruptive behavior. One way of resolving the tensionthe order-maintenance or unilateralist way-insists that on the street,
the police officer's interest in using force to establish control takes
priority, and defers questions of the rule of law to the courtroom.8 8
Pushing the rule of law off the streets and into the courthouse
reinforces the tendency to treat civilian scrutiny of police conduct on
the street, even if only by challenging the police to justify their
intrusion, as the sort of activity that merits a physical, forcible
response.89 This unilateralist or order- maintenance approach conflicts
8 Al Baker, U.S. Police Leaders, Visiting Scotland, Get Lessons on Avoiding Deadly Force,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2015), http: //www.nytimes.com/2015/12/12/nyregion/us-police-leadersvisiting-scotland-get-lessons-on-avoiding-deadly-force.html?_r=O
[https://perma.cc/2UHB-AZRK]
(discussing ways in which Scottish police de-escalate and disengage from circumstances likely to
result in unnecessary violence).
Jerome Skolnick calls this the conflict between "law" and "order." See SKOLNICK,

supra

note 3, at 6.
' Id. at 5.
86

Id.

" Id. at 6.
8
See, e.g., Robin Celikates, Rethinking Civil Disobedience as a Practice of ContestationBeyond the Liberal Paradigm 23 CONSTELLATIONS 37, 37 (2016) (describing one popular claim:
that democratic institutions are the proper place to raise disagreements with government action).

Indeed, it is (on the order maintenance view) precisely the police ability to use force, willy-nilly,
that aligns the interests of law enforcement and civilian during an encounter, stop, or arrest. If
non-compliance may always be met with force, then civilians have no interest in resisting; the only
issue is how most effectively (forcefully or non-forcefully) to ensure that the civilian complies, and
that the police are able to do their job and maintain control.
" See John Kavanaugh, The Occurrence of Resisting Arrest in Arrest Encounters: A Study of
Police-Citizen Violence, 22 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16, 25-26 (1997).
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with rule of law, which preserves certain rights of non-compliance even
during lawful stops, arrests, and other seizures. 90 Too often, in the
name of control or public order,91 we see the police subject civilians to
"petty," 92 but nonetheless forceful, indignities in response to small acts
the officer, 94 cussing the
of lawful, non-violent resistance 93-taping
officer out or treating the officer disrespectfully, 9 5 refusing to put out a
cigarette. 96 In these circumstances, it is the public who need protection
from unlawful or excessive police force, rather than the police requiring
protection from the public.
All this is to reiterate that, even during a lawful seizure, when the
police have most power and most reason to search and seize, the ruleof-law and public-order interests of police officers may be internally
inconsistent and can come apart in important ways. Even at its zenith,
the police power to interfere with civilians is a legally limited one. 97
Policing often inflicts harms upon the individual (not simply through
the normative consequences of an arrest, but also through the
inconvenience and stigma of encounters, stops, and searches). 98 Given
these legal limits, police interference stands in need of justification.
See infra Section II.B.
Egon Bittner's definition of the police in terms of force is worth repeating here. See
BITTNER, supra note 2, at 39. Jerome Skolnick uses a similar definition of the police role as one of
ensuring '"social control' through threat of coercion and summary judgment." SKOLNICK, supra
note 3, at 8.
92 In Terry v. Ohio, the Court challenged the idea that these indignities are indeed "petty."
392 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1968). As the Court commented: "it is simply fantastic to urge that such a
procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a
wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the
person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly." Id. The Terry Court found that the practice of frisking inflicts a substantial
indignity on the civilian, involving as it does, the officer "feel[ing] with sensitive fingers every
portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and
armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs
down to the feet." Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and DisarmingCriminals, 45
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954)).
9 Kavanagh, supra note 89 (finding that "arrestee disrespect" was primary factor prompting
police use of force); see also Robert E. Worden et al., On the Meaning and Measurement of Suspects'
'o

91

&

Demeanor Toward the Police: A Comment on Demeanor and Arrest, 33 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME

DELINQUENCY 324, 324 (1996) ("One of the most widely accepted and widely replicated findings
about police behavior is that police tend to sanction suspects who display a disrespectful demeanor
towards the police.").
14 See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004) (discussing arrest of suspect for tape
recording police officer, even though there was no such offense under state law).
9 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001) (discussing "gratuitous
humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment" in
arresting civilian).
9
Orin Kerr, The Law of the Sandra Bland Traffic Stop, WASH. POST (July 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/the-law-of-the-sandrabland-traffic-stop/?tid=ainl [https://perma.cc/V6W4-TVUL].
17 See Harmon, supra note 42, at 902-04.
9 Id.
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Where the police lack some justification to arrest or otherwise interfere
with a civilian, the usual baseline applies, and they stand in relation to
that civilian as any other person would. And, like any other person,
when the police lack the required justification to interfere, they must
respect civilians' refusals to comply or cooperate-to resist policing.
B.

Challenging or Waiving

The law empowers police officers to engage in a variety of more-orless intrusive investigatory practices that impinge upon civilians'
liberty rights. I shall consider three characteristic types of law
enforcement activity that occur during police-civilian interactions up to
and including arrest: (1) non-custodial following and questioning, (2)
asking for consent to search a person or her effects, and (3) custodial
interrogations. In each of these types of encounters, I suggest, the
various rights not to comply or cooperate with police activity depend
upon the actions of the civilian to refuse to comply and to terminate the
police activity. I then demonstrate that each of these three types of
police activities has undergone sustained criticism over the past forty
years directed at the ways in which the police use psychological ploys
and pressure to preclude the sorts of challenges that lead to civilian
non-compliance or non-cooperation with the police. These psychological
ploys have attracted such sustained criticism because they enable the
police to dominate the public by undermining an individual's ability to
choose or assert her various rights to be free from police interference.
1. Free to leave.
The difference between a custodial stop or arrest and a noncustodial encounter turns on whether the police officer interferes with
the civilian's liberty right to decline the interaction. That right is neatly
captured by the idea that the civilian is "free to leave." 99
Non-custodial encounters do not implicate the Fourth Amendment
at all.100 In the context of an encounter, the civilian and the police
officer share equal legal standing to initiate or terminate the encounter.
On the one hand, "police officers can approach individuals as to whom
they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially
incriminating questions."1 0 1 The police may initiate an encounter for
any reason or no reason, as they choose. On the other hand, to

" United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
'0n An encounter, as I refer to it, is a non-custodial interaction between police and civilians.
Because the encounter does not, on this definition, entail a search or a seizure, it does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment or its protections.
' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
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counterbalance the police freedom to initiate encounters, the Court has
consistently recognized the civilian's right to refuse (for any reason or
no reason) to participate in police encounters. 102 As early as Terry v.
Ohio, the Court recognized that whenever a member of the public is
approached by a police officer, "ordinarily the person addressed has an
equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away."10 3 The individual
retains her liberty right "to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter," 104 and "remains free to disregard the [police
officer's] questions"1 05 and "to disregard the police and go about h[er]
business."106
However, unless the individual does contest the encounter, by
refusing to comply or cooperate or otherwise challenge the police
officer's power to interfere with her, the encounter is presumed
consensual. The Court repeatedly emphasizes that "[1]aw enforcement
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of
unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the street
or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are
willing to listen."10 7 Law enforcement officers, like any stranger on the
street, may converse with and even question the people they encounter
while going about their daily business. 108 So long as the police do not
use threats or intimidation (just like interactions with other strangers
on the street) the encounter is non-coercive.
102 To be clear, I am using the term "encounter" to refer to non-custodial interactions between
the police and a civilian, in which the police do not have the right take the individual into custody.
103
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also id. at 34 (White,
J., concurring) ("There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a policeman from addressing
questions to anyone on the streets . . . . Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer,
answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.").
104 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202 (2002) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-36).
10' United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
10
Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201 (quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 826 (1991)).
107
Id. at 200; see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) ("[L]aw enforcement officers
do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in
another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions
to him if the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal prosecution his
voluntary answers to such questions.").
"o Given its tolerance for quite aggressive police tactics, the Fourth Amendment's seizure test
provides police officers a great deal of discretion to engage in encounters unless a civilian actively
demurs. So long as the officer speaks calmly with "no application of force, no intimidating
movement, no overwhelming show of force, no brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no
threat, no command," Drayton, 536 U.S. at 204, then there is no seizure and the encounter is
presumptively voluntary. "[S]o long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance with
their requests is required," Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437, then ordinary police questioning is
presumptively cooperative, whatever the actual state of mind of the civilian. Indeed, the
presumption of voluntary cooperation has the perverse effect, at the point of litigating encounters,
of "mak[ing] ... the government advocate for the view that reasonable people can and should
decline to cooperate with police." Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to
Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483,
1484-85 (2007).
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The law of police encounters establishes that police interactions
with civilians rise to the level of coercion only if the officer impedes the
civilian's freedom of movement or demands that the individual answer
questions. 109 Police officers can engage in quite intrusive activity before
their conduct rises to the sort of coercion covered by the Fourth
Amendment. For example, asking an individual for identification,1 10
including immigration papers,1 11 is not enough to establish the sort of
coercion sufficient to make an encounter involuntary, 112 so long as the
civilian questioned is free to "go about his business." 113 Instead, the
sorts of coercive police activity sufficient to constitute a seizure requires
that the police use 1l 4 or threaten the use of force,11 5 or engage in some
other "intimidating"' 16 assertion of police authority, such that the
individual reasonably felt that she was not at liberty to disregard the
police, "terminate the encounter . . [and] refus[e] to cooperate.""'
The civilian, not the police, is the one who bears the burden of
establishing, by her words or conduct, that she does not want to
cooperate or comply with the police. 1 8 To rebut the presumption of
'0

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984).
Hiibel v. Sixth District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004) ("Asking questions is an
essential part of police investigations. In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person
for identification without implicating the Fourth Amendment.").
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 220 (1984).
1
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991); see also
Delgado, 466 U.S. at 220 ("Persons such as respondents who simply went about their business in
10

the workplace were not detained in any way; nothing more occurred than that a question was put
to them.").

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
"5 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Bostick, 501 U.S. 429; Delgado,
466 U.S. 210. "[Tlhe threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,
some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at
544.
.. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 ("Unless the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating
as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave if he had
114

not responded, one cannot say that the questioning resulted in a detention under the Fourth
Amendment.").
117

Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436-37.

118 See, e.g., Raymond, supra note 108, at 1484 ("[I]t is the individual's responsibility to avoid,
defuse, or refuse interactions with police that lead to the seizure of contraband or evidence."); see

also Daniel J. Steinbock, The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality,
Obscurity, and Incivility of the Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 507, 540-41 (2001) ("The crux of avoiding a consensual encounter is noncooperationrefusal to answer questions and to consent to police requests.... [Tihis requires a fair degree of
self-confidence and a willingness to flout the conventions of common discourse (which, of course,
this is not). Nevertheless, it is the sine qua non of consensual encounter avoidance. 'Can we see
your driver's license?' 'No!' 'What are you doing here?' 'I am not answering,' or less politely, 'None
of your business."'). The result is that the Court has "construct[ed] a highly artificial 'reasonable
person,' who is much more assertive in encounters with police officers than is the average citizen,
and ...
ignor[es] the subjective intentions of the officer." Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line
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voluntary cooperation, the person questioned must actively demur to
indicate that she does not want to interact with the police. Refusing to
comply or cooperate, "declin[ing] to listen to the questions at all and ...
go[ing] on his way" 119-that is the manner in which an individual
legally signals that she has decided to terminate the encounter.
Resistance or non-compliance is built into the standard for
assessing when the police have engaged in a coercive interaction. The
test to establish when a seizure occurs asks what a reasonable,
innocent person would feel free to do, given the law enforcement
official's conduct. 120 The Court's reasonable person standard envisages
a person who is not only un-intimidated by police questioning, or by
requests for identification or papers, 121 but also is comfortable with
having police officers positioned in the doorways of her place of
employment, 122 or walking up and down the cramped aisles of buses or
124
subway cars, 123 or "trains, planes, and city streets."
Law enforcement officials are not required to tell the civilian that
she need not interact with the police, whether at the outset of an
encounter or even when a custodial stop has ended and it has entered a
non-custodial phase. 125 Thus, when a police-civilian interaction that
begins as custodial, coercive, and thus involuntary (the individual is
not free to leave) transforms into one that is voluntary (the police
officer has finished her official business and would let the civilian go if
she tried to leave), it is up to the civilian to discern that shift in her
legal status because the police officer has no obligation to inform her
that the custodial stage has ended and she now has a right to leave. 126

Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988).
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
119
120 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438 ("[T]he 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person.").
The officer must request, not demand, the documents. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Decline of
the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1274
(1990) (The officer "requested, but did not demand to see Mendenhall's identification. This
conduct, in Justice Stewart's view, did not constitute 'an intrusion upon any constitutionally
protected interest."').
122 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984). In his discussion of Delgado, Tracey Maclin argues
that "[r]ather than placing the burden on the government to show justification for its intrusion,
[the Court] puts the onus on the citizen to challenge government authority." Maclin, supra note
121, at 1306.
See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 121, at 1306 (comparing the locomotive rights of the riders of
123
subway cars to the workers in Delgado).
124
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 438.
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 202-04 (2002) (rejecting Eleventh
2
Circuit's per se rule that police officers must warn civilians of their right to terminate an
encounter); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996) (stating that it would be "unrealistic to
require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search
may be deemed voluntary").
126
Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-40.
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If the civilian falsely believes she has a duty to remain and cooperate
with the police then-so long as the police have not unreasonably
induced this belief-Fourth Amendment protections do not apply, and
the police can take advantage of the civilian's false belief to question or
observe her as part of a criminal investigation. 12 7
Even terminating the encounter is a legally fraught business. 128
The Court repeatedly emphasizes that the civilian has a right to decline
non-custodial encounters, and leave or go about her business. The
officer is not to regard the civilian's refusal to comply, on its own, as a
justification for seizing the non-compliant individual. 129 However,
individuals cannot, as a legal matter, leave in any way they see fit. For
example, if the civilian is encountered in a "high crime" area, then
leaving too quickly, or actively fleeing 30 can overcome the usual
presumption that a refusal to cooperate with the police does not
constitute the sort of suspicious activity that could operate as grounds
for a seizure. 13 1 All this is quite apart from the (illegal) tendency to
treat refusals to cooperate as "contempt of cop." 1 32

The Fourth Amendment thus places a high burden on a civilian to
resist the police only in the appropriate way. Indeed, to decline the
encounter, the Constitution requires her to act as an innocent person
would.133 And the civilian may in fact be innocent, even if the officer
has probable cause to arrest or reasonable suspicion to seize. So
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine both requires resistance
from and places the risk of resisting-including that the officer will use
force to terminate lawful resistance-upon the civilian.
2. Consent.
For the past forty years at least, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of consensual policing. At the same time,
however, the Court has emphasized that consent must be voluntary,

127
128

id.

It may be a practically and prudentially fraught business as well. The police may react
unlawfully and badly to a refusal to comply. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Training to Reduce 'Cop
Macho' and 'Contempt of Cop' Could Reduce Police Violence, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 18, 2015),
128

http: //theconversation.com/training-to-reduce-cop-macho-and-contempt-of-cop-could-reduce-police-

violence-51983 [https://perma.cc/SS77-RFBD]; see also Steinbock, supra note 118, at 546 ("Jacobs
did exactly what the Supreme Court in the consensual encounter cases said a citizen is free to do:
refuse to answer questions or give identification and then walk away. For his pains he was

arrested and prosecuted.").
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
20 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
1'
See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
132

See Cooper, supra note 128.

133

INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984).
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and that the public has the right to refuse to consent to police searches
or seizures where the police lack reasonable suspicion or probable cause
to believe a crime is being or has been committed. Put most plainly, the
default presumption is non-consent; constitutionally, "consent is [the]
exception[.]" 13 4 And the police may not simply infer consent from
acquiescence to a legal claim of authority: legally, affirmative consent is
required to search.13 5
Nonetheless, the Court thinks there are important advantages to
promoting consensual investigatory interactions between the police and
the public. Consent to search, the Court thinks, increases legitimacy by
encouraging the public to participate in the process of licensing police
searches. 136 Through the process of asking for and giving consent,
policing becomes a joint activity, in which the police and the civilian act
out of mutual respect and consideration. As the Court puts matters in
United States v. Drayton:13
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent
should be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers
act in full accord with the law when they ask citizens for
consent. It reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the
police of his or her wishes and for the police to act in reliance on
that understanding. When this exchange takes place, it dispels
inferences of coercion. 138
All in all, the Court presents civilians as having the legal right and
legal agency to extend or withhold permission for the officer to search.
The officer's actions in searching are legitimate only to the extent that
she respects that agency: first, by acquiescing to a civilian's refusal of
consent; and second, limiting her search to those areas reasonably
indicated by the civilian if she gives consent. 139 The Fourth Amendment
thus permits individuals to resist the initial request for a search and to
limit the scope of the search by requiring the police to adhere to the
boundaries dictated by the civilian.
Although (because of these legal liberty rights) in principle nonconsent is the baseline, in practice, the Court requires some clear

134 Nirej Sekhon, Willing Suspects and Docile Defendants: The Contradictory Role of Consent
in Criminal Procedure, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 110 (2011).
See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (discussing government's
13
cannot be
burden of proving "that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given ...
discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority").
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
136
137 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
1
1

Id. at 207.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
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evidence of resistance or non-cooperation to demonstrate non-consent.
Legally, an officer cannot demand or coerce consent: cooperation must
be voluntary to be consensual. 140 Mere acquiescence, in response to
overbearing and coercive police conduct, does not count, legally, as
consent. 14 1 In practice, however, it is "almost impossible to separate out
those situations in which a person 'truly' wants to consent from those
situations in which a person feels compelled to acquiesce." 142 Thus,
although voluntariness is a subjective standard focused on the civilian's
decision-making process, the Court has consistently looked to the
context in which the civilian chose to give or withhold consent, and has
regarded the actions of the police officer toward the civilian as
determinative.
The result is, absent non-compliant conduct, acquiescence
constitutes consent. In a trio of early consent cases, Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 143 United States v. Watson,144 and United States v.
Mendenhall,145 the Court held each time that the civilian's subjective
choice to give consent to a police search was not, under the totality of
the circumstances, vitiated by overbearing or coercive police conduct.
The civilian's consent was voluntary so long as it was not the result of
"implicit threat or covert force," 146 no matter that the civilians may be
from vulnerable populations (Hispanic men in Schneckloth; 147 an
African American woman in Mendenhall 48) who might feel particularly
incapable of resisting the police officer's polite "May I?"149 All that
matters is the outcome: whether the defendant complied or not. 150
One reason non-compliance is necessary is the Court's focus on
police conduct. There is no coercion, and thus consent is voluntary, so
long as the police officer does not engage in some "overt act or threat of
140
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 218.

142

Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 268 (2001). See

also id. at 227 ('The reality is that consent searches are upheld except in extreme cases that
almost always focus not on subjective factors of the suspect, but on the behavior of the police.").
143
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
14
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
145
446 U.S. 544 (1980).
146
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 228.
147

Id. at 218. While there is no direct mention of the race of the car's occupants in

Schneckloth, "Bustamonte and his companions appear to have been [H]ispanic." David A.
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup.
CT. REV. 271, 329 n.238 (1997).
148
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558.
14
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Devon Carbado, (E)Racing
the FourthAmendment, 100 MICH. L. Rev. 946 (2002); Strauss, supra note 142, at 268.
'o See generally Ric Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understanding the Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L. J. 773 (2005).
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. [nor engage in] more subtle forms of

coercion that might flaw his judgment."1 5 1 In fact, courts find that
passively going along with police requests to search almost always
indicates consent, under the totality of the circumstances.
It is worth remembering that while consent could be used as an
alternative to an arrest or other lawful seizure (an officer with probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to suspect a civilian of criminal activity
could first seek consent), the police may seek consent precisely when
they lack a justification for seizing a civilian. 152 Indeed, the idea that
consent is a substitute for an officer's legally cognizable justification for
a search or seizure underpins the doctrine. The Court has recognized
that the police have an overriding interest in obtaining the consent of
the public to participate in police investigations: "In situations where
the police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause
to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent may be the
only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence."15 3
However, the Court treats that interest favorably as a reason for
promoting consent. 154 Thus, even the fact that the defendant was
already detained by the state and in custody may be insufficient to
establish non-consent.1 5 5 Instead, under the voluntariness standard's
focus on the civilian's capacity for choice, some more overt act of nonconsent is usually required to establish that the civilian does not wish
to cooperate with law enforcement.
The idea that some overt act of resistance or non-compliance is
required to indicate non-consent is solidified in a line of cases that more
directly focuses on the reasonableness of the officer's actions in
inducing consent (and so less on the civilian's subjective
characteristics). The officer-focused test equates non-coerciveness with
reasonableness, and reasonableness with consent. 156 Where the civilian
"' United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976). This standard is strikingly similar to
the standard for voluntariness developed contemporaneously in the plea bargaining context.
Though (probably thanks to a comparison in Schneckloth) the confessions context has produced
most comparisons (see Simmons, supra note 150), the Court's language is most similar to its
analysis of waivers of rights in the plea context. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
755 (1970).
See Alafair S. Burke, Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 67 FLA. L.
152
REV. 509, 540-41 (2015).
153
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227.
Burke, supra note 152, at 528.
'5
Watson, 423 U.S. at 424 (stating the defendant "had been arrested and was in custody, but
115
his consent was given while on a public street, not in the confines of the police station"); see also
Strauss, supra note 142, at 268.
'6 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); see Simmons, supra note 150. A more apt
comparison may be with plea bargaining as increasingly formal such that coercion there matches
coercion in the consent context. For example, just three years before Schneckloth, the Court held,
in Brady v. United States, that psychological coercion can undermine the ability of an agent to
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complies with the police, so long as the officer's conduct is nonthreatening, consent is presumed. The only way to rebut this inference
of consent is through express, clear resistance to the officer's request.1 57
For example, in United States v. Drayton, police officers boarded a
bus and announced that they were conducting a drug interdiction. An
officer stationed himself in the driver's seat, next to the door, as other
officers entered the bus and questioned the passengers. A variety of
factors could have indicated the encounter was coercive: the officers'
display of badges; their clearly visible (though holstered) weapons; their
choice to question passengers on the bus rather than in the bus
station; 15 8 the officer's decision to question just prior to the bus's
scheduled departure; and the close proximity between the officer and
the passengers when asking for consent to search. Nonetheless, the
Court discounted all of these factors when finding that Drayton had
voluntarily consented to a search of his person: the consent was
voluntary because Drayton did not resist, but instead cooperated with
the police; and that cooperation was not coerced through overt physical

threats.159
3. Right to silence and to an attorney.
Perhaps the most famous of the investigatory rights are the rights
to silence and to an attorney. These rights expressly entitle civilians
not to comply: the police officer wants the civilian to answer her
questions, and to do so unassisted by an attorney's advice. And the
reason these rights are famous-"part of our national culture" 6 0 -is
the requirement, first articulated in Miranda v. Arizona,16 1 that police
officers expressly warn civilians of these rights. Under Miranda's
prophylactic warning scheme, not only does the civilian have a right to
resist or challenge the police during a custodial detention: the police
must expressly inform the civilian that she has these rights.

engage in rational choice or limits the range of choices a rational agent may have. The Brady
Court conceded that extreme psychological coercion "produce[d] . .
by actual or threatened
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant," is unconstitutional.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). However, the Court accepted that the
government is constitutionally permitted, under the Due Process Clause, to limit the range of
choices available to the defendant, so long as such a limitation is not produced by threats,
misrepresentation, or bribes. Id. at 755.
157 Ambiguous words offered to show non-consent are not enough, where the civilian's actions
otherwise indicate consent.
" The officers waited until the passengers boarded the bus before questioning them. Janice
Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SuP. CT. REv. 153,
185 n.95 (2002).
i9
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002).
"' Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
'6'

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

318

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

The Miranda Court regarded its warning scheme as advertising
two "basic" rights: 162
[These] rights ...

are enshrined in our Constitution-that "No

person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself," and that "the accused shall . . . have
the Assistance of Counsel" . . . These precious rights were fixed

in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and
struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were
secured

"for

ages

to

come,

and .

.

. designed

to

approach

immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach

it."163

And the Miranda Court was clear that competitive contestation
between police and the public necessitated the warning scheme to
ensure that "the constitutional rights of the individual could be
enforced against overzealous police practices. "164
Once again, however, while the baseline is a constitutional right
not to comply with police officers' attempts to incriminate oneself,
passivity waives the right. Non-compliance is not only the essence of
the rights to silence and to an attorney, but necessary to invoke these
rights. Consider one of the two rights covered by the Miranda
warnings: the privilege against self-incrimination. "[A] witness who
desires the protection of the privilege .

.

. must claim it at the time he

relies on it."165 Passivity is not enough. Absent an express invocation, a
civilian eventually waives her right to silence. 166
The problem animating Miranda was the worry that the police
could coerce confessions from recalcitrant civilians. The great
innovation of the Miranda decision was to make it easier for the
civilian to resist interrogation. First, the Court designated all custodial
interrogations as interactions deserving of increased judicial scrutiny,
because such interrogations were presumptively coercive. 167 Second, the
Court emphasized the contestatory nature of the interrogation, by
requiring the police interrogator to provide the civilian with a series of

162
163

164
165

Id. at 442 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 387 (1821)).
Id.

Id. at 444 (citing Silverthorn Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).
166 Id. (requiring express invocation of right to remain silent); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370, 381 (2010) (remaining silent, even for extended period of time, insufficient to assert

right to remain silent).

See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 446-53
(1987) (arguing that Miranda introduces a "[c]onclusive [p]resumption of [c]ompulsion" in the
interrogatory sphere); see also Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 945 (2000) (agreeing with Schulhofer).
167
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warnings, and to ask the civilian whether or not she wished to speak to
the police and whether or not she would like an attorney to help her
decide what to say, if anything. 168 Third, the Court went further than
subsequent cases in the encounter and consent context by-in Miranda,
at least-demanding that the police must avoid both physical and
psychological threats, and backed up these protections by imposing a
"heavy burden" upon the state to prove that any uncounseled custodial
interrogation was voluntary. 169 Uncounseled waiver, in other words,
was a sign of police coercion. 170
After Miranda, however, the law on custodial self-incrimination
has increasingly placed the onus for contesting police questioning on
the civilian (rather than treating the warnings as regulating the
police). First, the Court limited what counts as the sort of custody
triggering Fifth Amendment protections. The Court separates the sort
of questioning that occurs during a nominally cooperative encounter, or
even a somewhat coercive police stop, from questioning during a full-

's
The warning system is roundly derided as ineffective. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Questioning
the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1027 (2001)
[hereinafter Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda] ("Miranda imposes few, if any, serious
costs on the individual actors of the criminal justice system or the system as a whole . . . It does
not impede effective law enforcement. . . . [Tlhere is no compelling evidence that Miranda causes a
significant number of lost convictions .. . [I]t also offers few benefits for its intended recipients.
Contrary to the visions of its creators, Miranda does not meaningfully dispel compulsion inside the
interrogation room."); William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 976 (2001)
("Miranda's regulatory strategy ...
shift[ed], from courts to suspects, the burden of separating
good police interrogation from bad. Instead of courts deciding based on all the circumstances ...
whether the suspect's confession was voluntary, Miranda left it for suspects to decide, by either
agreeing to talk or by calling a halt to questioning and/or calling for the help of a lawyer, whether
the police were behaving too coercively. A growing literature on the empirics of police questioning
shows why that strategy has failed."). More effective, some have suggested, would be to require a
contemporaneous recording (video or audio) of the interrogation. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 487 (1996)
("Videotaping interrogations would certainly be as effective as Miranda in preventing police
coercion and probably more so."); Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits"of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929, 933-34, 934 n.19 (1995) (arguing
that the Miranda Court made a mistake by failing to mandate audio or video recordings of
warnings during interrogation); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87
WASH. L. REV. 965, 1028 (2012) (arguing videotaping is necessary to evaluate the voluntariness of
waiver); Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda, supra, at 1028 ("[Eflectronic audio- or video-

recording of interrogations is the most promising interrogation reform of our era."); Stuntz, supra,

at 978 ("[T]he only way to regulate police tactics would then be to look hard at them, case by case,
with the aid of video- and audiotape."). While video or audio taping may be additionally useful,
they are no substitute for the warnings themselves.
169 Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 475.
"0 Id. The idea was that only someone who was coerced would confess against her interests,
absent some overwhelming proof to the contrary. The Court later rejected the determinative status
of an against-interests statement in the context of confessions and consent. In so rejecting the
heavy weight allotted to against-interest statements when considering voluntariness, and instead
focusing primarily on physical coercion or the threat of such coercion, the Court effectively allowed
the police to resume psychological trickery to induce cooperation and confession.
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blown custodial detention. 17 1 Only the latter receives the Fifth
Amendment's protection, including the requirement of the Miranda
warning. Otherwise, the interaction is governed by the Fourth
Amendment's rules for declining to cooperate during the encounter,
which apply outside the custodial setting, 17 2 and the police are free to
ask questions and elicit incriminating information without informing
the civilian of her rights not to cooperate.
Second, even when the suspect is in custody, the Court has
transformed Miranda's focus so that the Court now concentrates upon
the voluntariness of waivers. 173 The voluntariness of a waiver depends
less upon the civilian's subjective decision-making and much more upon
the actions of the police interrogator in coercing a waiver. The Court's
jurisprudence has, in effect, slowly moved from an almost-categorical
voluntariness test in which a confession almost automatically
undermines the voluntariness of a waiver, to something closer to the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test. 174 The Court developed its
Fourth Amendment test in the context of encounters and cooperation.
That test focuses on the actions of the police and treats civilian
acquiescence as voluntary cooperation so long as the police do not
engage in physical violence or threats thereof. The Miranda waiver
test, developed in the context of custodial interrogation, has mostly
followed this same path. So long as police conduct is non-intimidating,
any civilian compliance with the request-or demand-to cooperate is
taken as consent.
For example, the Court endorsed the admissibility of nonthreatening police questioning in Moran v. Burbine.175 In that case, the
Court dismissed the legal significance of the confessor's subjective
mental state, instead contrasting "free and deliberate choice[s]"1 7 6 with
7
ones that were the product of "intimidation, coercion or deception,"17
where coercion was understood as "physical or psychological
In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), the Court held that Terry stops are non17
custodial. They are by definition brief and take place in public, not in the police-dominated
atmosphere of the station house. The effect of Berkerner is, for the purposes of police interrogation,
to equate custody with coercion.
72 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). The Court held that an individual must assert
the privilege in order to claim the privilege.
Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda, supra note 168, at 1021 ("Mirandahas helped
17
law enforcement by de facto displacing the case-by-case voluntariness standard as the primary
test of a confession's admissibility, in effect shifting courts' analysis from the voluntariness of a
confession to the voluntariness of a Mirandawaiver.").
1
See, e.g., GEORGE C. THOMAS III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM
TORTURE TO MIRANDA AND BEYOND 174-75 (2012) (discussing Rhode Island v. Innis as holding

that subtle coercion is not enough to require Mirandawarnings).
175 475 U.S. 412, 433-34 (1986).
17
177

Id. at 421.
Id.
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pressure."7 8

Similarly,

in

Colorado

v.

Connelly,1 79

the

Court

emphasized that "[t]he voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege
[against self-incrimination] has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching[J." 18 0 The Court stressed that its worry was whether
or not the officers "intimidate[d] or threaten[ed] respondent in any
way." 18 1 In each case, once the police recited the warnings, the burden
of asserting the privilege against self-incrimination,
absent
intimidation, lay with the civilian seeking to avoid confessing.
Reducing Miranda's heightened waiver standard creates a gap
between physical
coercion-which
would violate
the
Fifth
Amendment-and non-coercive conduct designed to induce waiver. So
long as the police do not threaten or intimidate the civilian, they may
use various forms of trickery or psychological manipulation to induce
waiver.
Trickery undermines a civilian's ability to resist police attempts to
act against her interests. The problem is not simply the one articulated
in Moran v. Burbine182-that the civilian does not have all the
necessary information before her.183 Instead the problem is that,
however much information the civilian has to work with, she does not
decide on her own, but decides under the influence of police pressure
(whether she knows it or not).
Trickery thus removes from the equation the sort of responsiveness
that contestation makes essential. The officer need not respond to the
civilian's articulation of her rights or any information she produces,
because that is not the way in which a trickery-based interaction is
structured. Instead, a trickery-based interaction contemplates a
unilateral, non-responsive approach; one in which the officer seeks a
particular outcome no matter what. Indeed, just this worry motivated
the Miranda Court, which expressly held that "any evidence that the
accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course,
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." 184

178

Id.

182

479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 170.
Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979)).
475 U.S. 412 (1986).

18.3

In that case, the police neglected to inform the defendant that his attorney was outside the

*

interrogation room, waiting to represent him. The Court implicitly recognized that such conduct
was trickery: it just was not the sort of "'trick[ery]' that can vitiate the validity of a waiver.
Granting that the 'deliberate or reckless' withholding of information is objectionable as a matter of
ethics, such conduct is only relevant to the constitutional validity of a waiver if it deprives a
defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them." Id. at 423-24 (internal citations omitted).
184
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966).
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Police-Induced Waivers

The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence on
encounters and interrogation distinguishes between the government's
obligation not to threaten or intimidate civilians into waiving their
rights and a government obligation to provide the civilian with all the
information necessary to make a fully informed choice. The
constitutional law of encounters and interrogation thus distinguishes
between the negative freedom to be free from state coercion, through
physical threats and intimidation (which freedom the Court is willing
to protect), and the positive freedom to access those facts in the state's
hands that might be relevant to the civilian's choice (which freedom the
Court will not protect). In between these two types of freedom lies a
third way in which the state may affect the civilian's decision-making:
psychological pressure designed to influence the civilian to do as the
state agent desires. 185 It is this psychological influence that the Court
treats as permissible and which the police often seek to exploit during
encounters or interrogation.
This sort of psychological manipulation or influence directed by the
police toward civilians has been a theme of encounter and investigation
law for the past fifty years. Often, the worry is that civilians feel
coerced, even if the police do not perceive their behavior as coercive
(and the Court, applying a police-centric standard, does not either). 186
But a more invidious feature of psychological influence emerges
when the public does not experience police manipulation as a form of
intimidation, yet nonetheless acts under the sway of police
manipulation. In such circumstances, the police can use psychological
techniques unilaterally to control civilian behavior. Though not
See, e.g., Sekhon, supra note 134, at 110 ("Nor are courts concerned with the myriad ways
185
in which coercion that falls shy of physical threat compels individuals to say 'yes' to a police
officer's request to search."). The police may also engage in trickery or subterfuge, including flat
out lying to the civilian. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
40 (1982) [hereinafter Skolnick, Deception by Police]; Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The
Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1992); Christopher Slobogin, Lying and
Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1275 (2007) [hereinafter Slobogin, Lying and Confessing];
Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 OR. L. REV.
775, 782 (1997). But see Robert P. Moesteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and
Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833 (1997) (rebutting certain claims made by Slobogin). I will not
delve into the muddy waters of the propriety of lying to suspects in this Article. It is sufficient to
note that, for the most part, there is a general agreement that it is wrong to use deception to
induce civilians to waive their rights. See Skolnick & Leo, supra, at 5. Distaste for deception grows
stronger as we move from police deception that induces people into revealing evidence during a
search, to police deception that induces people to incriminate themselves during an interrogation,
to testimonial deception by police under oath to obtain a conviction. See, e.g., Sekhon, supra note
134, at 107 ("The Court purports to be more concerned that suspects have a 'real choice' to
withhold consent in the interrogation context than in the search context.").
18
Nadler, supra note 158; see Carbado, supra note 149, at 968 (discussing perpetrator
perspective).
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intimidated, the civilian is nonetheless dominated by the police, and
induced to comply or cooperate, unwittingly and unquestioningly, with
police directives. This form of psychological domination is designed to
ensure that civilians forego their opportunity to contest the legitimacy
of police activity or to choose to do otherwise than the police direct.
1. The police officer's courteous "May I."187
The police use conversational techniques to extend encounters in
ways that allow them to exert unilateral psychological influence over
civilians, to ensure those civilians follow police directives. For forty-five
years, at least, courts have recognized that "under many circumstances
a reasonable person might read an officer's 'May I' as the courteous
expression of a demand backed by force of law." 188 If the baseline
contemplates force as necessary to exert control, then even polite
requests may signal non-negotiable directives. Indeed, the Ninth
Circuit's prescient conclusion, explicitly endorsed by Justices Douglas
and Marshall (both in dissent) in Schneckloth, has been fortified by
"empirical studies over the last several decades on the social psychology
of compliance, conformity, social influence, and politeness .

.

. all [of

which] converged on a single conclusion: the extent to which people feel
free to refuse to comply is extremely limited under situationally
induced pressures." 189
In many of these studies, the impact of circumstantial factors such
as surprise, 19 0 physical proximity to the subject, 191 an authority
relationship between the questioner and subject, 192 or the willingness of
others to accede to the questioner's requests, 193 was demonstrated to
create a tense or overbearing atmosphere in which the subject became

" Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 275, 289 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting;
Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1971)).
188
Schneckloth, 448 F.2d at 701.
89 Nadler, supra note 158, at 155.
"0 See, e.g., Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L. Q.
175, 185, 189 (1991) (discussing the impact of unexpected police activity in inducing consent).
1i
Nadler, supra note 158, at 190-93.
Id. at 186-90; Alisa M. Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the "Consensual"
Encounter: An Experimental Study, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 285, 318-22 (2013) (finding
compliance with a perceived authority to be a primary reason civilians consent to police
encounters).
183
Nadler, supra note 158, at 179-83.

324

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

less likely to refuse to comply with some request. 194 The claim is that
such activity is sufficiently discomfiting to amount to coercion.19 5
Thus, while some of the policing literature, concerned with fitting
the psychological features of law enforcement's consent-inducing
behavior into the court's coercion jurisprudence, tends to stress the
feelings of domination associated with polite request-demands for
consent to search, such feelings could also be associated with a sense of
obligation (a legally acceptable form of "coercion") as much as a fear of
sanctions. 196 In either event, the individual is psychologically
manipulated to waive her rights in ways she might not choose to do
were she confronted with a peer or inferior.
Police interactions with civilians need not threaten force to engage
in the sort of psychological manipulation sufficient to induce consent.
Indeed, the very fact that the request is phrased in a low-key manner
may have a greater psychological impact than if phrased as a highstakes demand. 197 Polite requests are often interpreted as commands,
especially if the request comes from a superior (or someone who is
perceived as a superior). 198 Accordingly, because police officers are state
officials who civilians commonly perceive as having legal authority and
as wielding a great deal of legal and physical power, the police can use
199
their status to subtly transform their requests into demands.
Overtly, the officer may be extremely polite. However, consciously or
not, the civilian target of the police officer's investigatory suspicion may
feel an obligation to comply with the officer. 200
Consider, for example, two of the major cases in the consent search
literature, Schneckloth and Drayton. In Drayton, the Court repeatedly
emphasized that the officers were extremely polite:
19
See also Steinbock, supra note 118, at 534-35 (describing a series of studies demonstrating
that individuals were more likely to comply with requests from an authority figure than a peer or
subordinate, and more likely agree to a "consent" search if they feared reprisal by the officer if
they refused).
'9
See, e.g., Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, supra note 185.
196 Nadler, supra note 158, at 165 n.26 (discussing the psychology of feeling free to refuse
government requests to search). Nadler notes that these feelings could manifest themselves as a
sense of obligation or fear.
19
See also Steinbock, supra note 118, at 534 n.137 ("Studies have also shown that a friendly,
nonthreatening initial approach is significantly more likely to produce compliance than is a
forceful initial stance. In the area of consent searches, search requests phrased interrogatively
were more likely to produce the requested consent compared to those phrased declaratively.
Ironically, therefore, a consensual encounter may be effective precisely because it is less
confrontational than a stop.") (internal citations omitted).
'9" Nadler, supra note 158, at 175.
199 Id. at 186-90.
200
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211-12 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
officer said the police were 'conducting bus interdiction,' in the course of which they 'would like ...
cooperation.' . . . The scene was set and an atmosphere of obligatory participation was established
by this introduction.").
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The Court pointed to the officer's quiet and polite tone of voice,
the fact that he did not state or suggest that citizens he spoke
with were required to answer, that he talked to passengers one
by one, and that he did not say or suggest that passengers could
not leave the bus or could not terminate the encounter. 20 1
Similarly, in Schneckloth the officers appear to have been calm and
polite, simply asking Alcala, one of the occupants of the car they had
stopped for a registration violation, "Does the trunk open?" 202
In other words, he merely asked a question, the point of which is
usually to obtain information. He did not directly request
permission to search the trunk. Yet Alcala's response-finding
the key and opening the trunk-indicates that he understood
this ostensible question as at least a request, and probably a
command, to open the trunk. 203
The officer's polite "May I" may be part of a scripted interdiction
strategy, 204 or it may be part of the officer's casual but regular policing
practice. 205 In either case, officers regularly make it their practice to
ask:
[Vjague, conversational questions to suspects with the goal of
obtaining a suspect's consent to search, even though that
individual may not want to allow the search . .. Conversational

phrases like "Can I take a quick look?" or "Can I take a quick
look around?" have "emerg[ed] as .

jargon."

.

. a regular part of police

206

The whole point of the conversational consent technique is to
encourage the civilian to participate in and extend the search process
201

Id. at 186.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 220 (1973).
Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective
Literalism in
American Criminal Law, 38 L. & Soc. REV. 229, 235 (2004). They explain: "[We decide whether a
speech act is a request or a command by taking into account pragmatic information, such as the
relationship between the parties and whether the speaker has the authority to issue commands to
the hearer. What counts as a request by an equal may be taken as a command when issued by
one's superior." Id. at 231.
204
EPP ET AL., supra note 33, at 37-38 (discussing psychological tactics recommended by
popular police training manual to overcome lack of consent). But see Tracey L. Meares, The Law
and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. Sc. 335, 347 (2014); Tom R. Tyler et
al., The Consequences ofBeing an Object of Suspicion: Potential Pitfalls of ProactivePolice Contact,
12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 613 (2015).
20
See, e.g., Alexander A. Mikhalevsky, Note, The ConversationalConsent Search:How "Quick
Look" and Other Similar Searches Have Eroded Our ConstitutionalRights, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1077 (2014); Strauss, supra note 142, at 268.
206 Mikhalevsky, supra note 205, at 1080.
202
203
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through the verbal act of consenting. Perhaps the classic case of the
"conversational consent" search 207 is Ohio v. Robinette.208 In Robinette,
the officer completed his traffic stop, issued a citation, and then asked,
"'One question before you get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal
contraband in your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like
that?' Robinette answered 'no' to these questions, after which [the
officer] asked if he could search the car. Robinette consented." 209
As Justice Ginsburg noted in her concurrence:
The deputy testified in Robinette's case that he routinely
requested permission to search automobiles he stopped for
traffic violations. According to the deputy's testimony in another
prosecution, he requested consent to search in 786 traffic stops
in 1992, the year of Robinette's arrest . .. One Ohio appellate

court noted: "[H]undreds, and perhaps thousands of Ohio
citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels and asked to
relinquish to uniformed police officers their right to privacy in
their automobiles and luggage, sometimes for no better reason
than to provide an officer the opportunity to 'practice' his drug
interdiction technique." 210
These conversational consent searches employ techniques, which
(we will see) are familiar from the Miranda context, in which officers
use run-on sentences, minimizing, and other psychological strategies to
encourage civilians to speak up and thereby waive their rights. 211 In
each context, the officer's strategy is to initiate or extend the encounter
by giving the civilian a voice and opportunity to be heard. Yet it is
precisely by agreeing to talk, rather than resisting the officer's
invitation, that produces the civilian's waiver of her rights. The officer
sells the consent search to the civilian as an opportunity to dispel
suspicion or to help the police by cooperating in a process oriented
toward decreasing crime and increasing security. 212 Such a strategy
might, superficially, appear democratically laudatory (the Drayton and
Schneckloth Courts certainly thought so).213 But the real purpose of the
these conversational practices is (psychological) control: the police are

207

208
200

210

Id. at 1086 n.54.
519 U.S. 33 (1996).
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 40-41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

211
Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 292-93
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom].
212 Burke, supra note 152, at 528.
213 United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973).
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using tried and tested techniques of psychological influence to ensure
that the civilian follows their directives, whether she would rather
refuse to or not, and whether the civilian feels the compulsion arising
from a sense of internal obligation or external threat. 214
2.

Warnings and waivers.

The psychology of interrogation has been the subject of study for
over eight decades. 2 15 The police have employed such practices for well
over fifty years, 216 training in interrogation techniques since well before
the Court issued its decision in Miranda denigrating the value of
psychologically produced waivers and confessions. 217 There is
widespread agreement that these psychological techniques successfully
induce waivers and confessions by simultaneously encouraging the
civilian to participate in the process of interrogation while police
interrogators control its subject matter. Police interrogators exert such
"control over the suspect's attitudes and emotions," 218 that the
"structure
and . .. sequence
[leading
to
waiver
or
2
19
confession] . . . remain hidden from the suspect"
so that the suspect
does not even realize she has been manipulated by the police. 220
A variety of ethnographic studieS 22 1 have bolstered one of the
Miranda Court's core conclusions: 222 the police design their
214

Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, supra note 211,
at 292.

See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice
and Irrational Action, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 979, 981 (1997) ("[R]esearchers have studied'
psychological interrogation and false confession for more than eighty-five years[.]").
"6 Skolnick & Leo, supra note 185, at 3 ("[O)ver the last fifty to sixty years, the methods,
215

strategies,

and

consciousness

of

American

police

interrogators

have

been

transformed:

psychological persuasion and manipulation have replaced physical coercion as the most salient
and defining features of contemporary police interrogation.").
217 See Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, supra note 211, at 292 (Miranda"excoriated police
interrogation training

texts for compelling

confessions

through

psychologically

subtle and

&

sophisticated questioning methods.").
218
Ofshe & Leo, supra note 215, at 985 ("Psychologically-based interrogation works effectively
by controlling the alternatives a person considers and by influencing how these alternatives are
understood. The techniques interrogators use have been selected to limit a person's attention to
certain issues, to manipulate his perceptions of his present situation, and to bias his evaluation of
the choices before him."); see also THOMAS & LEO, supra note 174, at 187 ("We know that most
suspects cannot resist the effect of powerful preference-creating forces created by police
interrogation as it occurs today, and this might be true even when the police play it 'straight' and
refrain from using deceptive strategies.").
21
Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogationas a Confidence Game, 30 L.
SOc'Y REV. 259, 266 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Miranda's Revenge].
220 Id. ("We are con men . . and con men never tell the mark they've been had.").
221

See generally Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, supra note 211, at 294 (reviewing police

interrogation tactics based on observing 182 police interrogations); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 132-37 (1998) [hereinafter Weisselberg, Saving Miranda]
(reviewing California law enforcement training materials that encourage officers to question
"outside Miranda").

328

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2016

psychological manipulation of suspects during the interrogation process
to ensure that law enforcement interests dominate the civilian's
entrenched constitutional values. 223 And the police seek to maintain
that dominance whether or not the civilian invokes her rights. 2 24
The police actively encourage civilian participation in the
interrogation process, framing it as the way in which the civilian gets to
give voice to her version of events. 22 5 Participation undermines the sort
of resistance that depends on asserting the rights to silence and to an
attorney. The techniques used to induce participation are somewhat
ritualized: indeed, Charles Weisselberg, one of the foremost scholars on
police use of Miranda, argues that police tactics during interrogation,
like the practice of religious confession, is "based on the belief that
there is a reward for speech." 226 The ritual serves an important
psychological function, however. It serves to:
[C]arefully create and exploit the role obligations of the
[civilian]. These obligations are based on informal social
understandings built into the particular [situational context].
Drawing on these everyday understandings of the situation, the

222
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) ("[W]e stress that the modern practice of
in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. . . . [C]oercion can be
mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition.") (internal quotations omitted).
Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators'Strategies
223
for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 431 (1999) [hereinafter
Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda] ("[T]he police interpret and apply cases in light of their
particular concerns. In some instances, this may lead the police to interpret Miranda strictly, in
order to ensure that incriminating statements obtained by interrogators will be admissible. In
other instances, the police may interpret the post-Mirandacases so as to maximize the abilities of
interrogators to obtain admissible incriminating statements."); Charles D. Weisselberg, In the
Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (2001) (finding that police believe that
'"[o]utside Miranda' instruction emphasizes that Miranda describes only a value-neutral rule of
evidence; it does not embody a constitutional command. Thus, there is nothing legally or morally
wrong in interrogating a suspect who has invoked the right to counsel or the right to remain
silent").
224
See, e.g., Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 221, at 132-35 (police pursue beneficial
"material consequences" of continuing questioning after a civilian has invoked her rights, such as
gaining impeachment material for use at trial, discovering the location of physical evidence,
identifying other suspects or witnesses, and so on); Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After
Dickerson, supra note 223, at 1124 ("By transforming Mirandafrom an affirmative constitutional
command governing conduct in the stationhouse into a weak rule of evidence, the new vision has
encouraged officers to continue to question suspects who have asserted the right to counsel or the
right to remain silent. During the last decade, the practice has become so pervasive in some
jurisdictions that it has acquired its own moniker: questioning 'outside Miranda."').
225 Richard Leo compares the manner in which police interrogators structure the interview
process to a "confidence game" in which the officer "carefully contrives and frames the situation to
set up the mark." Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 264. The interrogator's frame is a
carefully constructed sequence of events designed to induce the civilian to waive her rights and to
confess. Id. at 266.
Charles D. Weisselberg, The Precinct Confessional, 21 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 57, 59 (2002).
226
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[officer] obtains compliance by appealing to the [civilian]'s
desires or personal vulnerabilities, as well as to his sense of
obligation within the situation. 227
As a first step in the interrogation process, the officer
predetermines whether or not the civilian is guilty by observing her
body language for telltale signs. 228 The practice of body-language
interpretation is, however, notoriously flawed. 2 2 9 It often produces
mistaken and overly-confident police assessments of civilian guilt.2 3 0

These predeterminations, even if mistaken and overly-confident, drive
the rest of the interrogation, in which the officer unilaterally seeks to
confirm the civilian's guilt by encouraging the civilian to participate in
the process, while simultaneously but subtly discouraging resistance. 231
A core feature of the process concerns the giving of Miranda
warnings, where the interrogator's goal is to encourage the suspect to
undervalue the significance of waiving her rights. Observers find that
the practice of interviewing the suspect can be quite avuncular at the
point of the civilian's waiver decision, reminding the civilian that she
has seen the warnings on television many times, "perhaps joking that
the suspect is already well aware of his rights and probably can recite
them from memory." 232
The low-key introduction of the Miranda warnings and the need to
sign a waiver form is part of a psychological strategy of minimization or
trivialization 233 in which the officer seeks to maintain unilateral control
over the interrogation-against the civilian's pragmatic and legal
interests-by inducing the civilian to comply with her wishes and sign
the waiver. Researchers found that "[ojne of the most powerful deemphasizing strategies involves focusing the suspect's attention on the
importance of telling his story to the interrogator." 234 As in the consent
227

Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219,
at 265.

Id. at 267-68 (discussing the manner in which police officers pre-determine
whether the
suspect is guilty, prior to full-blown interrogation).
228

229

See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 226-29 (2008).

2o

Id.
Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 270. Richard Leo's work reveals
one major way
in which the process is unilateral. Police interrogators are trained to discount and discourage
protestations of innocence, having first established to their satisfaction (if not in fact) that the
civilian is guilty. See Richard A. Leo & Deborah Davis, From False Confession to Wrongful
Conviction: Seven Psychological Processes, 38 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 35 (2010) (describing
interrogator's aim as controlling suspect's goals during interrogation, and psychologically inducing
the suspect to adopt interrogator's aim of establishing guilt).
232 Leo & White, Adapting to Miranda, supra note 223, at 434-35 (1999).
211 Id. at
435
231

m Id.; see also Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda, supra note 168, at 1019
("[Dietectives sometimes tell a suspect that he will only be able to tell his side of the story if he
waives Miranda, implying that the suspect will not be able to clear things up unless he first
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search context, low-stakes conversational manipulation is a powerful
psychological tool deployed by the police to induce civilians to comply
with police requests and waive their rights to silence or to an attorney.
The police employ similar tactics after waiver to induce
confessions. The interrogator will emphasize her role as a mediator
between the civilian suspect who needs to explain what happened and a
prosecutor who intends to aggressively pursue the harshest charges
possible. 235 The officer may also downplay the adversarial nature of the
proceedings at this stage, instead insisting that she is the suspect's
friend or ally, someone to whom the suspect should speak so she can
have a voice in the criminal process. 236
The interrogator's strategies, though she may portray a friendly or
joking tone and profess shared interests between the officer and the
civilian, 2 37 are designed to maintain unilateral police control over the
civilian's decision to waive her rights. "[A]ccording to the rhetoric of
police interrogation training manuals and courses, as well as the
conventional wisdom in police culture, the interrogation tactics that a
detective uses should be the decisive influence in a suspect's decision to
provide police with incriminating information." 238 The purpose of
interrogation strategy, though it may appear polite, non-threatening,
and respectful of the civilian's dignity, allowing her a voice in the
interrogation and waiver process, is nonetheless to ensure that the
civilian complies with the officer's wishes. This unilateral psychological
manipulation of criminal suspects by police investigators has proven so
successful that Miranda, with its prophylactic warning scheme,
appears to have had little impact upon law enforcement's ability to
secure a waiver of rights. 239 Indeed, so effective are some officers at
obtaining a Miranda waiver, some suspects may not even know they
have waived their rights or realize that they have been under the

answers their questions.").
235
See, e.g., Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda, supra note 168, at 1019 (recounting
officer claims she can mediate between suspect and prosecutor); Leo & White, Adapting to
Miranda, supra note 223, at 440 (same).
236
Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 275 ("[T]he detective portrays himself as the
suspect's friend and ally, if not the suspect's advocate, implicitly seeking the suspect's trust and
confidence.").
237 Id. at 266 ("The essence of the con that is police interrogation ultimately lies in convincing
the suspect that he and the interrogator share a common interest, that their relationship is a
symbiotic rather than an adversarial one.").
2
Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, supra note 211, at 292.
239
Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda, supra note 168, at 1027 ("Miranda has not
changed the psychological interrogation process that it excoriated, but has only motivated police to
develop more subtle and sophisticated-and arguably more compelling-interrogation strategies.
How police 'work' Miranda in practice makes a mockery of the notion that a suspect is effectively
apprised of his rights and has a continuous opportunity to exercise them.").
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influence of an interrogator whose goal was to maintain unilateral
control of the process from start to finish.
Yet these techniques of trickery and misdirection have profound
democratic consequences. They preclude individuals relying on the
reasons that apply to them, and so substitute psychological domination
for rationality. As Oxford philosopher John Gardner suggests, this sort
of manipulation:
[O]n the part of a liberal government . .. is [wrong] . . . because
it is a condition of its success that it is opaque to those who are
subjected to it. Manipulation does not confront but bypasses our
rationality; it does not override what we want to do with
something we want very much to avoid but rather makes us
believe that we wanted to do something different in the first
place. That kind of surreptitious approach to its people, the
liberal State should prefer to avoid. 2 4 0
Armed with the officer's reasons, individuals could determineautonomously, for themselves-whether to accept or refuse the public
official's offers of help, friendship, or security. If a civilian chooses to
extend a non-custodial encounter, she could demand that the officer
articulate her reasons for following, questioning, and so on. If the
individual decides to terminate the encounter, she can stop answering
(most)241 questions and walk away. 242

Trickery and manipulation to obtain waivers of guaranteed rights
is thus not only constitutionally problematic. It attacks the basis of our
democratic government, which is founded upon reciprocal consideration
of the position of the governed and the governor. Absent some process
to ensure that the public's rights and interests are taken seriously by
the state, consent and cooperation alone are insufficient to guarantee
the government is not taking advantage of its citizens in ways that
entrench hierarchical domination and state authoritarianism.

'40
John Gardner, The Functions and Justifications of Criminal Law and Punishment, in
OFFENCES AND DEFENCES: SELECTED ESSAYS IN THE PHLOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 201, 209
(2007).
241
She may be obliged to answer questions about her identity. She is under no obligation
to
tell the truth or to provide proof of identification. See INS v. Delgado 466 U.S. 210, 219-20 (1984)
(discussing police officers asking for "papers" during encounter).
242 If the encounter is custodial, contestation preserves the civilian's rights to decide whether
or not to cooperate, and if she decides to cooperate, how and how much to do so. See, e.g., Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the
search to which he consents.").
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III. CHALLENGING STATE POWER
Contestation is a necessary feature of democracy. We live in a
world of plural and conflicting values, where reasonable disagreement
and dissensus with other members of the body politic about questions of
justice or social welfare is a core obstacle to setting goals for ourselves
and our society. 243 Democratic practices are supposed to help us
overcome these obstacles. Furthermore, the police are central figures in
this democratic process. The police, as executive officials, posses the
power to impact in very direct ways our ability to set and achieve goals
on the ground, in our communities, for good or for ill. From the
perspective of constestatory democracy, "the special [democratic]
salience of the police immediately becomes clear: the police are both a
uniquely powerful weapon against private systems of domination and a
244
Contestation or
uniquely frightening tool of official domination."
245
to
impediments
not
resistance-"opposition and dissent" -are
policing, but important democratic checks upon it.
When setting communal priorities, modern democratic systems
must both cope with a diversity of opinions while also attempting to
prevent elites from dominating the decision-making process by
imposing their values on the rest of us. Any account of democracy must
accommodate both its participatory aspects-giving a voice to all
members of the body politic-and its contestatory aspects. A thriving
democracy, on this view, is not simply an echo-chamber for the
powerful, but a means of challenging and checking that power, one in
which the least in the society can look the greatest in the eye and
demand that she both produce reasons for her actions as well as
respond to the justified reasons of others. Thus, a core feature of
democratic politics is creating more or less structured opportunities for
members of the community to air their disagreement with each other
(including their superiors), take one another's views about justice and
interests seriously (whatever their status in the community), and
respond to those views by proposing and contesting solutions to our
common problems.

243

246

See generally MICHAEL STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES (1992); see also JOHN

RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131, 131-32 (1999) ("[A]
basic feature of democracy is the fact . .. that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive
doctrines ... is the normal result of its culture of free institutions . .. [and that] [c]itizens realize
that they cannot reach agreement . .. on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive
doctrines."). Rawls says much the same thing in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-35

(expanded ed. 2005). See also ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
118 (1969) (claiming political theory "spring[s] from, and thrive[s] on, discord").
244
David A. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1808 (2005).
245

Id. at 1809.

246

See THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND
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One democratic line of response to the fact of reasonable pluralism
is to ensure that each member of society is able to participate in the
decision-making process by being able to give voice to her interests and
values. We might think of this as an issue about the scope of
democracy-ensuring that as many as possible, and ideally each
member of the democracy, play some role in the deliberative and
decision-making process, either personally or (most commonly for large
democratic institutions such as parliaments and congresses) through a
representative.
Concerns about the scope of democracy do not translate into
guarantees of reciprocity. Allowing more people to voice their opinions
through the democratic process need not entail that their participation
matters to those making the decisions. Accordingly, acting upon the
participants'
views,
especially
given
the
competing
and
incommensurable values that may be at stake, requires the creation of
institutions and opportunities structured so that all members of the
public can ensure their values and interests are recognized, affirmed,
and addressed. 247
Perhaps the most central of the political institutions we have
constructed to engage in these types of challenges and disagreements
are representative assemblies, 248 such as a congress or a parliament,
the sort of institution John Stuart Mill described as:
A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country
can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the
government and of all other interests and opinions, can compel
them to listen, and either comply, or state clearly why they do
not, is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of the most
important political institutions that can exist anywhere. 249
Indeed, our democracy is filled with a plenipotentiary of what
Philip Pettit calls: "[A]1ternative institutions-judiciaries, tribunals,
ombudsmen,
upper houses,
and local boards-through
which
individuals, specific subsets of the citizenry, and (more ambiguously)

ITS LIMITS 88 (2010); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 86 (1999).
247 See, e.g., CHRISTIANO, supra note 246, at 94.

-

248
See generally WALDRON, supra note 246, at 72 ("[O]ur conception of legislative
deliberation
must respect the fact that a representative assembly is characteristically a place where people
assemble who are different from one another - in their backgrounds, experiences, and beliefs
and often opposed to one another - in their views about policy, social justice, and rights."); see also
id. at 86 ("[Ifn the circumstances of politics, it is important that communities make decisions in
forums and using procedures that are respectful of disagreement and allow contending voices to be
heard in a debate about what the solution to a common problem should be.").
249
Id. at 69 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, Of the ProperFunctions of Representative Bodies, in

CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 117 (1861)).
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even the citizenry itself might variously contest, review, or amend
decisions made by elected elites." 2 50
We would rightly regard such institutions as undemocratic if some
elite group could routinely impose its will upon them; for example, if
the legislature simply served to ratify the decisions of some
oligarchy. 251
We generally denigrate elite domination of the political process
(from above or below) because we want something more than a
facsimile of democracy to stifle dissent: we want actual democracy,
through institutions in which the citizenry are able to engage in a
public, political, participative (even if only representatively so) process
of debate and contestation, so as to challenge the government to
provide reasons for the choices it makes affecting our interests and
values, and force it to change its policies when they are
unreasonable. 2 5 2
David Sklansky has captured the way in which this democratic
tradition of participation and contestation applies to policing. What is
of
democratic
"spirit
a
is
suggests,
Sklansky
needed,
[in which] democracy is understood to involve
oppositionalism ...
ongoing opposition to patterns of unjustifiable hierarchy." 253 Sklansky
believes this form of populist oppositionalism combines what is best
about participation and contestation: the emphasis on individualism
characteristic of participatory theories, and the egalitarian resistance
to elite or expert domination characteristic of the pluralist theories.

250

JOHN P. MCcORMICK, MACHIAVELLIAN

DEMOCRACY 149 (2011) (citing PHILIP PETTIT,

REPUBLICANISM 193 (1997)). But contestation is a general feature of modern liberal democracy,
not only of neo-republican theory. See, e.g., Jane J. Mansbridge, Living with Conflict:
Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democracy, 91 ETHICS 466, 466 (1981) ("The
contemporary normative theory of democracy is almost entirely an 'adversary' theory, based on the
assumption of conflicting interests among the citizens and conceived largely as a means of
handling that conflict."). For example, Alice Ristroph has persuasively argued, these features of
resistance to sovereign authority are as much a feature of Hobbesian liberalism as Pettit's neoRoman republicanism. See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Sovereignty and Subversion, 101 VA. L. REV. 1029
(2015); Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrativeof Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555 (2015).
251
A venerable tradition in democratic theory celebrates this sort of elite rule, either by
directly denigrating democracy as the rule of uninformed masses as opposed to expert governors,
see PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 158 (G.M.A Grube, trans., 1992), or by arguing for a minimalist notion
of democracy, in which political elites "make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and
diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens" apart from the regular competition for votes at
election time. Tom Christiano, Democracy, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

(Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring 2015), http: //plato.stanford.edularchives/spr2015/entries/democracy
[https://perma.cc/AZT3-Q48E]. Ordinary citizens do have a role to play, on this view of democracy,
by rejecting elites when the elite view becomes sufficiently problematic or disruptive. Id.
252

See HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS

OF POLICY 4-5, 8, 12, 89 (2002); id. at 27 ("Government action without any reasons in support of it
is arbitrary in an elemental sense.").
253

DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 109 (2008).
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As Sklansky recognizes, the police have the power to interfere with
our lives in quite direct ways. The police can act on behalf of, or
against, political systems or members of the polity (including political
parties or just criminal gangs) that seek to undermine the public's
attempts at self-government in democracy-constraining ways. The
police are, by virtue of their executive roles, public officials engaged in
promoting or inhibiting contestation (or in his language, opportunities
for "opposition or dissent.") 254 A democratically defensible police force is
one that tolerates contestation as a bulwark against private or public
domination, including domination by the police. It envisions the police
as required to treat all legal subjects as political equals, able to look the
most powerful in the eye and demand that they adhere to the rule of
law.
A.

Democracy and Police Control

The police are among the administrative agents who have the
ability to decline to enforce the law while purporting to execute it.255 In
practice, the police also have the ability-and, some might argue, the
duty-to ignore the law and even to act in violation of it, often without
sanction. 256 A core feature of policing is that it presents a structural
conflict between the rule of law, which constrains police authority, and
imperatives of criminal investigation or "order," which unleashes police

254

Id. at 110.

'55

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 12, 55, 82-83

(1969); see also Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261, 26366 (2003) (suggesting that criminal law is dominated by the discretionary decisions of law
enforcement officials). As Davis points out, "[a]mong the most important administrators in
America are the police . . . [t]hey make some of our most crucial policies and a large portion of
their function is the administration of justice to individual parties." Id. at 8.
256 DAVIS, supra note 255, at 12; see also Carl B. Klockars, The Dirty Harry Problem, in
THINKING ABOUT POLICE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 428, 431 (1983) (discussing the problem of

the police using unlawful means to achieve the good ends of bringing criminals to justice); Robert
W. Benson, Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 681, 689
(2001) (discussing police misconduct and criminality in connection with the War on Drugs). A
recent Supreme Court case, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), presents just this tension
between ignoring the law and enforcing it. Strieff is a Fourth Amendment case. The police
unlawfully stopped a man leaving a house the police suspected of being a drug den. Upon
searching Strieff, the arresting officer discovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia.
Normally, the fruits of an unlawful search would be inadmissible in evidence. But what made this
stop and search permissible was the officer's discovery, upon asking for and checking upon on
Strieff's I.D., that Srtieff had an outstanding warrant, entitling the officer to arrest Strieff. The
independent existence of the warrant, the Court held, was an unforeseen intervening event
breaking the chain of illegality and permitting the police to arrest and search the defendant in
good faith, free of the sanction of exclusion. Id. at 2062. Importantly, the police had no right to
stop Strieff, and so Strieff's right to resist was intact. However, Strieff removes an important
remedy for one class of civilians when the police violate the right to walk away. Civilians with an
outstanding criminal warrant now lack the remedy of exclusion for the fruits of the unlawful
seizure and search. See id. at 2063.
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power. 257 Furthermore, the police are often tasked with defining the
legal limits of their own authority: "As invokers of the criminal law, the
police frequently act in practice as its chief interpreter. Thus, they are
necessarily called on to test the limits of their legal authority. In so
doing, they also define the operative legality of the system of
administering criminal law." 2 58
Given their investigatory incentives and interpretive power, and
the difficult policy choices even conscientious officers face, it is hardly a
surprise that "[a] startlingly high proportion of all official discretionary
action pertaining to administration of justice is illegal or of doubtful
legality." 259 Accordingly, testing police authority-what David Sklansky
has called the "substantive tactic . . . [of adopting a] presumptive but
260
rebuttable suspicion of all systems of hierarchy" -is an important
aspect of establishing the democratic authority of the police during an
encounter.
Contesting policing helps civilians to resist being subjected to the
pretextual interests of the state or the police department or the
individual officer 26 1 by requiring the officer to articulate the reasons for
following, stopping, questioning, and so on. 2 6 2 The civilian's ability to
exercise autonomous choices during the encounter is, in this case,
opposed to heteronomous choices, ones in which the individual is not
able to assess or assert her own interests, but chooses under the
influence of another. 263 What matters, for this sort of autonomy, is
See, e.g., BITTNER, supra note 2, at 34 ("[P]olicemen are inevitably involved in activities
that cannot be fully brought under the rule of law. Only a limited set of legal restrictions can be
conditionally imposed upon the police which, however, still do not make it impossible for the police
to proceed as they see fit."); SKOLNICK, supranote 3, at 6.
258 SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 12; see also Husak, supra note 255, at 263-66 (suggesting that
criminal law is dominated by the discretionary decisions of law enforcement officials). As Davis
points out, "Among the most important administrators in America are the police ... They make
some of our most crucial policies and a large portion of their function is the administration of
justice to individual parties." DAVIS, supra note 255, at 8.
259 DAVIS, supra note 255, at 12. As Davis elaborates, "[t]he difficult problems have to do with
choices by conscientious officers to exceed the strict limits of their authority in order to do justice
or to protect the public interest or to produce the results that common sense requires; yet minds
may differ as to what is justice or the public interest or common sense."
26
SKLANSKY, supra note 253, at 110.
261
See, e.g., Roger G. Dunham, Transforming Citizens Into Suspects: Factors that Influence the
Formationof Police Suspicion, 8 POLICE Q. 366 (2005).
262 It is thus slightly different from the traditional liberal or libertarian worry about having
the paternalist state determine the civilian's interests for her, and then act on the state's
evaluation of those interests. Paternalism precludes the individual from declining to act upon her
interests. The problem faced in the policing context is a different one: the civilian's interests do not
count equally with those of the police. The police officer or the state can dominate the individual
by substituting their interests for hers.
263
The worry is that a civilian must "depend[] on the goodwill of another- . . to live at the
mercy of another-[which] is in itself inimical to freedom." Philip Pettit, Republican Liberty and
Its ConstitutionalSignificance, 25 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 237, 239 (2000). Andrew Taslitz calls this
257
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being able to stand with the police (or other state officials) as a political
equal: for the civilian's interests to matter just as much as the person
doing the policing (and the constituency that the officer represents).
The police officer counts for no more (and no less) than the civilian: the
officer is not some citizen "elevated above" the others, who must be
spoken to with deference as some political superior and whose interests
can dominate those of the civilian. 264 Instead, both the civilian and the
police officer walk the streets on equal terms.
The political ability to contest policing, by resisting or dissenting,
forces the police officer to respond to a civilian, in part, by providing the
civilian with sufficient grounds to make a rational decision whether to
extend or terminate a non-custodial encounter or how to preserve her
other rights during a custodial one. 2 65 If circumstances change, so that
the police are legally permitted to investigate further, the democratic
politics of contestatory equality entitles the civilian to know what
authorizes these further intrusions.
These sorts of challenges constrain police power by requiring the
police to articulate the basis of their legal authority. Articulation
renders the encounter dialogic: the officer is required to have her
reasons ready at hand, so that she can respond to individuals'
challenges with legally sufficient justifications for her actions. 266 If she

process of authoritarian verbal subjugation "bullshit." See Andrew Taslitz, Bullshitting the People:

The Criminal ProceduralImplications of a Scatological Term, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383 (2006-,
07). He lists a variety of vices associated with bullshit: disrespect (id. at 1392-94); undermining
rationality (id. at 1394-95); and undermining our separateness from others (id. at 1395-98), which
I have termed "heteronomy." A central vice of bullshit or verbal psychological manipulation, as I
would less confrontationally term it, is the worry that, as Taslitz puts it, manipulation "skew[s]
public political deliberation," id. at 1405, and for my purposes, public political deliberation over
whether to indulge police claims to authority without question or only on condition of established
police legitimacy.
'"

Philip Pettit, Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective, 65 CURRENT LEGAL

PROBLEMS 59, 73 (2012).
2
See, e.g., Steinbock, supra note 118, at 539-40 ("A police officer approaches. 'May I speak to
you for a minute?' she says. One could simply say 'no,' . . . but civility and utility dictate on most
occasions that the first answer be 'Why?' or 'What is the reason, officer[.]' . . . The answer to this
initial query concerning the reasons for the impending conversation is all-important, however. If

the answer is directed at criminal investigation (for example, 'We are investigating narcotics
trafficking'), then the reasonable person ought to ...

just say no. The same holds true for requests

for identification or for questions concerning presence in the locale or travel plans. It also applies
to nonresponsive answers, such as 'this will just take a minute,' and to answers that respond with

a question, like 'Why do you ask?' In short, a knowledgeable reasonable person ought to require
the officer to state his or her business clearly, and at the first opportunity, in order to make an
informed decision about whether to proceed with the encounter. If the officer does describe the
purpose of the encounter and then veers into new territory, the same danger signals ought to be
triggered."). The same rationale is at work in the context of prosecutorial use of peremptory
challenges, which require the prosecutor to state her reasons for striking certain categories of
juror to enable a court to scrutinize her reasons for so striking. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231 (2005); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
266 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1968).
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cannot, the officer's only reasonable response is to desist from pursuing
the encounter. Requiring the officer to justify her actions gives each
individual participating in the interaction the ability to make choices
about the scope and nature of their interaction with, and exposure to
the legal authority of, the police (and the larger criminal justice system)
free from the overbearing influence of the officer. These choices are all
the more important given the vast physical and normative power that
rests in the hands of law enforcement.
In this view, the police are not, as William Ker Muir has called
them, "street corner politicians." 267 Instead, Muir might better have
adopted the term "street corner adjudicators." Because police officers
must balance what Muir calls the "contradiction of achieving just ends
I have called, following Jerome
with coercive means" 268-what
Skolnick, the competing interests of law and order269-they ought, Muir
[which] enriches [their]
suggests, to "develop an enjoyment of talk ...
repertoire of potential responses to violence and permits [them] to
touch the citizenry's souls . . . their hopes, their fears their needs to be
something worthwhile, their consciences." 27 0 Talk, Muir suggests, can
dispel the threat of violence so long as it responds to the dignitary and
substantive interests of the people policed. And this rational
responsiveness to the articulated interests of civilians not only dispels
the threat of violence, but also (so Muir insists) enhances the moral and
271
political development of the police.
Of course, the eloquent rhetoric of policing could be a one-way
street, a unitary means by an elite and remote authority to trick the
citizenry into compliance. So long as the official is not in fact inclined to
respond, then all of the officer's eloquence or solicitousness toward a
civilian is mere pretense designed to ensure compliance. Worse, an
official may be able, through trickery, to undermine a civilian's
interests without the civilian even recognizing that she has given up
her legitimate power to resist police activity. Pretended reciprocity is
insufficient for democracy. What matters for egalitarian encounters, of
the sort in which challenges count, is that the official is in fact
272
persuadable, and does not simply pretend to be persuadable.
What matters, from a democratic perspective, is that the police
officer use her eloquence more like a judge than like a legislator (or

267

WILLIAM KER MUIR, POLICE: STREET CORNER POLITICIANS (1979).

268

Id.
See SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 6.

269
270

MUIR, supra note 267, at 4.

27

id.

272

See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 240. (describing as politically inappropriate the surreptitious

state manipulation of civilians' beliefs).
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politician), by providing reasons that respond to the concerns raised by
the civilians ultimately subject to the coercive power of the police. That
is, policing, like adjudication, is democratic to the extent that it makes
room for and responds to contestation. 2 7 3
The willingness of the police to respect the individual's right to
challenge her sends an important signal about the individual's political
standing as a member of the community. The central issue is whether,
and how, the police officer respects the civilian as an equal participant
in the encounter. The civilian's ability to demand this sort of respect
from the police generates certain standards for the officer to live up to.
First and foremost, the ability to challenge the police depicts law
enforcement officials as rational, reasonable, and responsive.274 It is not
enough that the officer approaches the encounter with some predetermined plan. Encounters are dynamic events. 275 They escalate and
de-escalate in legal and practical significance or seriousness, and
expand and contract in scope. New justifications for police activity
emerge or evaporate as the encounter progresses. Accordingly, an
officer is rational and reasonable to the extent that she is willing to
respond to new evidence during the course of the encounter and be open
to persuasion by the public.

273

For example, Lon L. Fuller identifies as,

[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication ...

the fact that it confers on the

affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting proofs
and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor. Whatever heightens the significance
of this participation lifts adjudication toward its optimum expression. Whatever destroys

the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity of adjudication itself. Thus,
participation through reasoned argument loses its meaning if the arbiter of the dispute
is inaccessible to reason because he is insane, has been bribed, or is hopelessly
prejudiced. The ...
distinguishing feature of adjudication lies in the mode of
participation which it accords to the party affected by the decision.

Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits Of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 (1978). Lest
Fuller's notion of adjudication seem too formal for the street corner, Sudhir Venatesh, a sociologist

studying the "shady economy" of a poverty-stricken, minority neighborhood in Chicago repeatedly
emphasizes the importance of third-party dispute-resolution as a valuable function of community
relations. See SUDHIR ALLADI VENKATESH, OFF THE BOOKS: THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY OF THE

URBAN POOR 7, 106, 117, 259-60, 273, 342 (2006).
274 My vision of democratic thus fits with certain liberal understandings of consent more
generally. See, e.g., Sekhon, supra note 134, at 135 ("[L]iberal notions of consent ...
in the
aggregate . . . (require] that the State must be 'responsive' to the body politic. That is to say, they
mean that the State must offer plausible justifications to its citizens and that they must have
sufficient power to affect policy-making. This notion of responsiveness resonates with our shared
understanding of political legitimacy and popular agency-i.e., a legitimate government is one
that does the people's bidding, and to the extent that it fails to do so, the people have the
opportunity to select another one.").
275 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE
REVIEW COMMITITEE 26 (June 15, 2010), http://www2.cambridgema.gov/CityOfCambridgeContent

/documents/Cambridge%20ReviewFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSK3-4KDK] ("[E]ncounters with
members of the public are dynamic; the situation can change minute by minute.").
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This picture of the official as rational, reasonable, and responsiveas open to persuasion-reveals the officer as someone of equal standing
to the civilian: someone whose interests do not automatically trump the
person policed, but instead compete with (and in a tie, defer to) those of
the civilian. In this picture, the police officer is not a warrior or a
guardian, exercising her dominion over some inferior, 276 but a
rationally responsive public servant, able to choose how to act, and to
reconsider her actions in light of their impact on the civilian she
encounters.
The encounter operates as one locus of consensual policing only so
long as both parties are open to influence by each other. It is not
enough that the civilian participates by having a "voice" in policing. 277
She must also be able to resist policing, either by asking for reasons or
refusing to cooperate. Challenging policing allows individuals at the
bottom of the hierarchy, on the street, to participate or decline to
participate in the encounter in ways that respect her dignity and
autonomy as a member of the polity.
Contesting policing allows influence and information to flow from
the bottom-up, so that the officer and the police as an organization are
open to influences from outside the police organization (rather than
influence flowing in one direction, from the top of the police hierarchy
down and from inside the organization out to the public). 278 If the police
could recognize the legitimacy of contesting policing, it would render
the decision-making process porous to inputs external to the
organization. The community or individuals on the street could
influence the discretionary decisions of the officer they encounter in a
truly cooperative or consensual manner, one that expands the moral
and political horizons of the officer as much as the civilian. 279
The alternative is an authoritarian and dominative interaction, in
which the officer is free to ignore the civilian, and empowered to induce
In particular, someone that the officer has prejudged as guilty. See, e.g., JEROME SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE ON TRIAL 196-97 (2d ed. 1975) (describing the typical police officer as someone convinced
of her "ability to distinguish between guilt and innocence").
277
For a different perspective on the importance of "voice" in resolving disputes and restoring
order, see, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of
Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 133, 134-35 (2011) (discussing what he calls
"populist deliberative democracy"); Andrew E. Taslitz, The People's Peremptory Challenge and
Batson: Aiding the People's Voice and Vision Through the Representative Jury, 97 IOWA L. REV.
1675, 1706-07 (2011).
278 See, e.g., Ben Bradford et al., Why Do "The Law" Comply? Procedural Justice, Group
Identification and Officer Motivation in Police Organizations, 11 EUROPEAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 110,
112-14 (2014) (stating procedural justice at supervisory level encourages compliance by
subordinate officials); Tyler et al., supra note 204, at 609 (identifying suboptimal police practices
as a feature of increasing centralization and top-down management practices in police
departments); see also supra Section II.A.
276

279

MUIR, supra note 267, at 4.
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the civilian to act as the officer directs. 280 So long as the interaction
lacks reciprocity, the officer places the civilian in a subordinate status
to the official, one in which the civilian is unable to influence the
officer's beliefs or behavior. Officers may even regard the demand for
equal treatment implicit in the request for reasons as a form of
disrespect, and respond with force. 281
If our vision is dominated by investigation and order-maintenance,
then we will emphasize the ways in which the police can dominate an
encounter and unilaterally force their will on civilians. Walking away,
refusing to answer questions, or asking questions about the basis of
police authority to interfere, and other ways in which civilians may
question "the legitimacy and authority of the police" 2 8 2 will appear as
signs of "disrespectful behavior," 283 the kind that "undermine[s]" 2 84 the
police in ways that "impose social harm" upon the officer. 285 From this
perspective, we might even regard the officer's coercive or physically
forceful reaction to a civilian's inquiries or non-compliance as a justified
and proportionate response to the "harm" manifested through such

challenges.286
B.

The Benefits of Contestation

The force-anticipating baseline assumes that civilians must bear
the burdens of unlawful or aggressive policing. 287 Just consider "the
Some police officers actively advocate for this position. See, e.g., Sunil Dutta, I'm
a Cop. If
Don't Want to Get Hurt, Don't Challenge Me, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2014),
https: //www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-dont-want-to-get280

You

hurt-dont-challenge-me/
[https://perma.cc/QG9B-5MM9];
MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES,
SHARED
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 275, at 6 ("For their part, community members should understand

that when they are in the midst of an encounter with a police officer, they should strive to deescalate any perceived hostility by complying with the officer's instructions and responding to the
officer's inquiries, trusting that the officer must do her job[.]"); see also MISSED OPPORTUNITIES,
SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES, supra, at 26 ("[P]olice also should discuss with their communities the
role of community members in being cooperative and civil with their police officers. . . . The time to

question a police officer's actions is not at the very moment of the encounter, but later, when there
are no safety or security considerations at issue."). This attitude is likely, Muir thinks, to produce
"habits of avoidance, brutality, or favoritism ...
that tend to compound moral and intellectual
disorientation, leading to ever increasing isolation from human companionship, and, eventually, to

personal deterioration." MUIR, supra note 267, at 4.
28
See, e.g., Michael D. Reisig et al., Suspect Disrespect Toward the Police, 21 JUST.
243-44 (2004).
282
Id. at 243.
2&3

Id.

284

Id.

285

Id.

Q.

241,

See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 23, at 324 ("One of the unfortunate traditions in policing
has
been for officers to treat any form of disrespect, whether through a look or words, as 'contempt of
cop,' and to respond with verbal abuse, threat, use of force, or arrest.").
28 This worry is reflected in repeated critiques of the Terry opinion's discussion of race. See,
e.g., Paul Butler, A Long Step Down the Totalitarian Path: Justice Douglas's Great Dissent in
286
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talk" parents of African American children give their children. 288 These
instructions are often considered a formative aspect of the African
American experience. Children are taught not to question the police. Be
polite. Do not make eye contact. 289 Do not question the reason for the
traffic stop. Do not point out that the law in this state doesn't require
you to leave your car. Do not ask if your race was the reason you were
targeted in the first place. African Americans are not told to be silent:
they are told to be non-confrontational. But the twin options of silence
or asking about the lawful limits of a custodial detention are precisely
the ways in which civilians assert their equal standing under the rule
of law as members of the political community. The sort of conduct
encouraged by "the talk" requires African Americans to forgo their
political standing and constitutional rights to ensure a non-forceful
encounter. Here, the orderliness of the encounter does not exclude the
presence of unilateral, authoritarian policing, but manifests it.
Responsiveness alters our vision of policing. If we recognize the
political (and legal) right to contest police authority, we will expect
more from our police than the order-maintenance model implies. 290 We
will recognize the need to "accommodate and to capitalize on
disagreement and conflict. They reflect a view of dissensus as not just a
sign of a well-functioning democracy, but a precondition for it. 2 91 We

Terry v. Ohio, 79 MISS. L.J. 9 (2009); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy:
Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271 (1998).
28
See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 149, at 1020 ("Yet blacks make this compromise or strike this
bargain all the time. Indeed, their parents, family members, and community leaders teach them
how-when, if at all, to speak, when and how to say 'Sir,' or Officer, or Trooper, whether or not to
move, and when, if at all, to assert rights. In short, blacks grow up with the expectation that they
will be called upon to negotiate their dignity and privacy in the context of police encounters."). TaNehesi Coates makes much the same point in a book that is a prolonged version of this "talk"
addressed to his son. He describes the various threats to African Americans' security and dignity
as: "Disembodiment [which] is a kind of terrorism, and the threat of it alters the orbit of all our
lives and, like terrorism, this distortion is intentional. . . . Disembodiment. The demon that pushed
the middle-class black survivors into aggressive passivity, our conversation restrained in public
quarters, our best manners on display, our hands never out of pockets, our whole manner ordered
as if to say, 'I make no sudden moves."' TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 113

(2015).
289 This instruction is likely to prove counter-productive. Police officers are taught to
scrutinize body-language for trustworthiness, and are taught that certain eye movements are a
sign that the suspect is lying or guilty. See, e.g., Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 26970.
280
It is worth mentioning, even in a footnote, that the President's Task Force on 21st Century
Policing, in its embrace of the "guardian" model for the police, implicitly embraces ordermaintenance over the more robust role for the police that I am advocating. The Task Force's
description of the guardian role emphasizes "protection." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 8,
at 10. Without more elaboration, that role fits comfortably within the traditional police activity of
order-maintenance, one in which the police seek to make civilians comply with their orders. See,
e.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 3, at 5. In this, and other, ways, the Task Force's Report remains a
rather conservative approach to the problems of policing.
291
SKLANSKY, supra note 253, at 110.
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will expect an officer who has exceeded the limits of her legal authority,
or who has come to recognize that the exercise of her lawful authority
will only cause the situation to further deteriorate, to respond by
backing off, or de-escalating the situation, or tak[ing] the higher
road," 292 to "perhaps plan a different enforcement action that can be
taken more safely later . . . [or] to refuse to engage." 293 While such
tactics place constraints on police activity, those constraints are ones
that derive from democratic, egalitarian imperatives that we are all,
police included, subject to as members of the polity.
Resisting and contesting policing thus makes demands upon the
police, ones that require the officer to treat challenges as the political
prerogative of an equal, rather than a subordinate. Equals are entitled
to respect and worthy of responses, justifications, and changes in
tactics to accommodate legitimate police conduct (rather than
dismissed as disrespectful and harmful to the officer's "elevated" 294
status). And it is the egalitarian model of policing that the Constitution
has entrenched in core aspects of its doctrine.
IV. REDUCING FORCE THROUGH PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The resistance-based model of policing requires the police avoid
treating legally justified resistance as triggering a forceful response. In
this view, some conflict or non-compliance is essential to preserving
certain constitutional rights. According to this model, the police must
treat constitutionally protected acts of resistance as appropriate
responses to police activity, even during an encounter. Resistance
marks the limit of the police power to interfere with the public.
Other models of policing, however, assume or endorse the view that
the police are generally permitted to control disorderly on-the-street
interactions with the public, even to the extent of using force to subdue
dissent or resistance. Procedural justice advocates one method of
control: a set of psychological techniques to induce civilian compliance

292

See MISSED OPPORTUNITIES, SHARED RESPONSIBLITIES, supra note 275, at 26 ("Ideally,

both the police officer and the civilian will conduct themselves reasonably and will choose to deescalate any tense encounter. But if the civilian does not do so, the officer must be trained to take
the higher road and work to de-escalate the encounter."). The Committee's report makes room for

responsiveness if, in fact, a civilian does challenge the police during an encounter. It does,
however, take a starkly different position as to the civilian's right to challenge during an
encounter. The Committee thinks that responsible citizens should wait until after an encounter
(that is, until after the officer has inflicted some harm upon the civilian) to contest the encounter.
Id. I disagree, in part because such harms, though they may be preventable during the encounter,
may not be capable of remediation afterwards.
293
Testimony by Chuck Wexler, Executive Director Police Executive Research Forum,
Jan. 30,
2015, TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING at 21.
294

Pettit, supra note 264, at 73.
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with police directives. These techniques prevent encounters from
escalating, thereby rendering them conflict-free, and thus non-violent.
But procedural justice comes with certain costs. Its focus on
constraining police use of force does not address other ways in which
the police dominate their interactions with the public. Nor does it
recognize one way in which such domination may be constitutionally
suspect and politically wrongful: by undermining the civilian's ability to
resist. The officer may psychologically dominate members of the public
by pretending to endorse the civilian's values as her own. The officer
may simply fake her belief that she and the civilian are part of a group
that share and promote the same values. The civilian is more likely to
act on a false belief (that the official has her interests in mind) and so
cooperate with the official, whether or not she really should. 295 In this
view of democratic engagement, training the police to mouth polite
phrases is not enough to ensure that the officer genuinely respects the
individual and her values. The officer does not treat the suspect as a
peer in this form of encounter. Genuine respect requires more than
psychological techniques, it requires actual empathy. And procedural
justice does not ensure that the police officer deploying its techniques
takes this extra step.
In the next few sections, I shall provide a brief description of
procedural justice, and then identify three challenges that my theory of
constitutionally and politically permissible resistance poses for
procedural justice: first, that a psychological theory premised on
inducing compliance replicates a series of practices already extensively
critiqued in the context of encounters, consent, and confession; second,
that the sociological and psychological account of legitimacy-what I
call credit-worthiness-proposedby procedural justice is, on occasion, at
odds with normative, constitutional, and political understandings of
legitimacy; and third, that procedural justice masks, rather than
ameliorates, structural problems at the heart of investigatory policing.
Procedural Justice

A.

Procedural justice is a causal and psychological theory 296 that
investigates which strategies are most effective at producing voluntary
See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity of ProceduralJustice
and Police Legitimacy: An Empirical Test of Core Theoretical Propositions, 39 J. CRIM. JUST, 489,
495 (2011) [hereinafter Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity] ("[P]rocedural justice
predicts police legitimacy, which in turn affects cooperation and compliance. Procedural justice
and police legitimacy are subjective, psychological judgments about perceived fairness.").
See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau et al., Examining Macro-Level Impacts on Procedural Justice and
299
Police Legitimacy, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 333, 333 (2012) ("Procedural justice is, by definition, a socialpsychological concept. It is grounded in citizens' perceptions, judgments, and opinions, and is
influenced both by actual police behavior and by certain aspects of citizens' personalities and
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compliance with the law. 2 9 7 We can identify two ways of inducing

compliance: external and internal. 298 External techniques for inducing
compliance require the use of sanctions or inducements that affect the
individual's behavior. 299 Internal techniques require the public to
persuade individuals that they ought to accept the official's directives
as obligatory. 300 Procedural justice claims that these internal
techniques are more effective at producing compliance than external
techniques.
The central insight of procedural justice is that, by structuring
interpersonal interactions in certain ways, authorities can generate a
variety of effects on people's beliefs and attitudes that "both increase
voluntary public deference to police .

.

. directives and encourage long-

term public acceptance motivated by a sense of personal responsibility
to follow the law." 30 1 These internal, psychological effects are more
robust than external social pressures, such as rewards and sanctioning,
because they are longer lasting and internalized, inducing individuals
to take personal responsibility for acting in accordance with the
authority's directives or regulatory goals. 302
An especially attractive side-effect of internal compliance is that,
because it is not focused on external sanctions such as the use of force
or other forms of punishment, it reduces or eliminates conflict during
police encounters with civilians. 303 If the officer behaves more
dispositions.") (internal citations omitted).
297

WALKER, supra note 23, at 316 ("The most important research on achieving
voluntary

compliance with the law is in the field procedural justice, with Tom Tyler as the major
theoretician."). It is worth reminding ourselves that "voluntary," in both the legal and social
psychological literature, does not mean free from influence, or fully autonomous choice. It is
compatible with heavily influenced, heteronomous choices. The important point for voluntariness
is that the choice is free from instrumental inducements or sanctions.
Procedural justice uses the terms instrumental and "normative" or "procedural." See, e.g.,

19

&

TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 20-26, 161-65 (1990); see also Anthony Bottoms
Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal
Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 120 (2012) (describing Tyler's contrast between the
instrumental and the normative); Jacinta M. Gau, & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and

Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men's Perceptions of Police Legitimacy,
27 JUST. Q. 255, 258 (2010) (contrasting instrumental with "internalize[d]" factors inducing
compliance); Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295 (discussing
&

instrumental and normative aspects of procedural justice); Kristina Murphy et al., Motivating
Compliance Behavior Among Offenders: Procedural Justice or Deterrence?, 43 CRIM. JUST.

BEHAVIOR 102, 103 (2016); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do
People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233 (200809) [hereinafter Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation] (contrasting instrumental and
procedurally just theories of compliance).
2" Tom R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 94, 20-24 (2002).

o Id. at 54-57.
391

Id. at xv.

W

Id.

soa Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies
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considerately, then the person policed responds favorably toward the
police officer, 304 because she internalizes the officer's actions as creditworthy and, because credit-worthy, obligatory. 305 Each is less likely to
use or respond with violence during the encounter.
A core procedural justice claim is that external factors exogenous
to encounters do not produce as deep and lasting compliance and
cooperation effects as factors that are endogenous to the encounter. 306
Exogenous factors would include law-abiding police practices, 307 just
outcomes, 308 reductions in crime, 309 increases in quality of life or-as a
direct result of an encounter-expected rewards or sanctions.3 1 0 Two
exogenous factors in particular are worthy of note. At the back end of
police interactions with civilians, the outcome for the civilian (and
indeed, ultimate police success in fighting crime) is less relevant to how
the civilian feels about police authority than the way she was treated
during the encounter. 311 At the individual level, negative outcomes,
expressed through legal sanctions, are less important than the way the
police treat civilians during the encounter. 312 At the community level,
reductions in crime rates do not produce commensurate increases in
public approval of the police. 3 13
At the front end of interactions between police and civilians,
lawfulness-whether the police have an adequate justification for
engaging in a stop, search, arrest, questioning, and so on-does not
make a significant impact on public evaluations of (sociological or
psychological) legitimacy (what I call "credit-worthiness")-whether the

and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 347-48 (2011)
[hereinafter Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads].
w
TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at 132-35.
a Id. at 52.
a See Meares, supra note 204, at 347.
1o
Tracey L. Meares et al., Lawful or Fair? How Cops and Laypeople View Good Policing 103
(Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 255, 2014).
8 Jason Sunshine & Tom Tyler, Moral Solidarity, Identification with the Community, and the
Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical Representatives of a Group's Moral
Values, 66 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 153, 156 (2003).
319
Id. at 153.
310 See TOM TYLER & STEVEN BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 6-8 (2013) (arguing "[rieward-driven incentive

systems encourage desired behaviors by rewarding those behaviors. Such strategies focus on the
social facilitation of behavior that benefits the group, but may not benefit the individual.
Punishment-driven sanctioning systems discourage undesired behavior by punishing those
behaviors.").
311
See, e.g., Jacinta M. Gau, ProceduralJustice and Police Legitimacy: A Test of Measurement
and Structure, 39 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 187, 189 (2014) [hereinafter Gau, Procedural Justice and
Police Legitimacy].
312
See, e.g., id. (discussing performance and procedural models of public support for the police,
and finding that the process-based or procedural justice model is more effective).
313
See Meares et al., supra note 307, at 103-06.
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public thinks that the authority treats them in a fair and just
manner. 314 Lawfulness includes such factors as "whether the police
comply with the law, which includes obeying statutes, department
rules, and court decisions. Do they, for example, treat people equally?
Do they not use excessive force? Do they comply with the Miranda
decision?" 315
Public evaluations of police credit-worthiness, on the other hand,
depend upon how the public perceives police conduct and measures
whether the public thinks the police are fair and just.3 16 "These
perceptions are a matter of social psychology, and they may or may not
reflect

the

reality

of . ..

official[]

action.""'

What

matters

for

perceptions of credit-worthiness, it turns out, are the features of police
conduct that are internalized and endogenous to the interaction
between police and public. Neither of the exogenous factors has much
impact on the public's perception of whether they should comply or
cooperate with the police, as compared with endogenous factors. 318
Procedural justice explains which aspects of police conduct can
affect these public attitudes toward policing. Procedural justice tells the
police which psychological strategies they ought to adopt to more
effectively exert control or generate credit-assigning attitudes from the
individuals they interact with on the street or in the station house.
Such strategies cause the subjects of regulation to internalize a sense of
obligation and also feelings of trust toward the authorities with which
they interact. These psychological regulatory strategies have
attitudinal and behavioral consequences, which in turn have important
policy and political implications. 3 1 9 Procedural justice suggests that if
authorities alter their behavior to match individuals' perceptions of fair
treatment or beneficent motivations during their interactions with the
civilian, then the civilian will in turn prove "more willing to consent to
the directives of legal authorities" 320 than if the official adopts
strategies designed to manipulate factors exogenous to the interaction,

314
See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 23, at 316 (distinguishing lawfulness from legitimacy);
see
also Meares et al., supra note 307, at 105.
315
316

317

WALKER, supra note 23, at 316.
Id.

id.

TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at xiii (The subjects of regulation "follow legal decisions and
rules because they think that they ought to do so, irrespective of whether they believe that legal
authorities might sanction them for noncompliance.").
318

31

E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 9

(1988).
320

TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at xiv.
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such as those underlying lawfulness of the officer's conduct 321 or the
outcome of the dispute. 322
Importantly, then, authorities, including the police, can learn to
influence or promote these attitudes and behaviors during their face-toface interactions with the public. The police can use procedural
strategies "to bring public behavior into compliance with the law and
increase the likelihood that members of the public will more willingly
accept the directives of police officers[.]" 3 2 3 More generally, the way in
which officials structure their interactions with civilians tends to
produce positive (or negative) effects. Officials may produce these
psychological and behavioral effects consciously or unconsciously, but
(given the right circumstances) the official will inevitably produce some
psychological or behavioral effect willy-nilly. 324 Accordingly, the goal of
public officials and other institutional authorities, procedural justice
contends, should be to structure their interactions with the public so as
to ensure that these encounters produce positive effects for the
individual and the institution.
The core structure of a procedurally just interaction has four
or
and trustworthiness
respect,
voice, neutrality,
features:
325 The first two features speak to the quality of the
benevolence.
321
Meares et al., supra note 307, at 108 ("[T]he public does not define lawfulness or determine
the appropriateness of sanctioning the police through the same lens of legality that police and
other legal authorities use. . . . [O]rdinary observers focus on the comportment and demeanor of
the legal authorities. This means that public attention is paid to how legal authoritiesact once they
have decided to engage a person and are implementing their decision by interacting with members
of the public.").
322

TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at xvi.

.

Id. at xiii; see id. at xiv ("This model is based on the argument--empirically tested.
that individual legal authorities can behave in ways that encourage the voluntary acceptance of
their directives.").
324
See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 23, at 320 ("[P]olice conduct makes a difference. Good police
conduct, particularly respectful policing, has a positive effect on peoples' assessment of police
legitimacy, whereas bad conduct has a negative effect."). On the "benevolence" formulation of these
factors, see for example, Meares, supra note 204, at 347. ("First, participation is an important
element. People report higher levels of satisfaction in encounters with authorities when they have
an opportunity to explain their situation and perspective on it. Second, people care a great deal
about the fairness of decision making by authorities. That is, they look to indicia of decision-maker
neutrality, objectivity and factuality of decision making, consistency in decision making, and
transparency. Third, people care a great deal about how they are treated by organization leaders.
Specifically, people desire to be treated with dignity, with respect for their rights, and with
politeness. Fourth, in their interactions with authorities, people want to believe that authorities
are acting out of a sense of benevolence toward them. That is, to discern why authorities are acting
a certain way, people assess how those authorities are acting. They want to trust that the
motivations of the authorities are sincere, benevolent, and well intentioned.") (internal citations
omitted). I prefer the term benevolence to trustworthiness, because trust is one of the effects
produced by the process, and I find the idea that trustworthiness produces a feeling of trust
analytically true (even tautologous) rather than empirically enlightening. That benevolence
induces feelings of trust has, in my view, more explanatory value.
325
See, e.g., Kristina Murphy et al., Promoting Trust in Police: Findings from a Randomized
Experimental Field Trial of Procedurally Just Policing, 24 POLICING & SOc. 405, 407 (2014)
323
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civilian's participation in the process: whether she is given space to tell
her side of the story and how the officer responds to her
participation. 3 26 The last two features respond to the individual's
"moral" expectations, and establish a sense of solidarity between the
authority and the regulatory subject. 327 They demonstrate that the
authority and the civilian are members of a shared community, and
that the authority appreciates the civilian as such a member.
Recently, procedural justice scholars have begun to appreciate that
each subset of factors produces different effects. The participative
factors of voice and neutrality are most strongly correlated with
prompting a sense of obligation toward the authority, so that the
civilian internalizes its rules and directives as legitimate and deserving
of compliance. The moral factors produce a sense of trust toward or
solidarity with the authority, which the civilian internalizes as her
shared membership in a group, and which orients her toward voluntary
cooperationwith the authority. 328 And each of these features, legitimacy
and trust, compliance and cooperation, can be boosted or undermined
by the way in which the officer acts during her encounter with the
civilian, much more than exogenous factors such as the actual
lawfulness of the encounter or the outcome for the civilian or the larger
community.
B.

Compliance and Cooperation

Consider first the compliance effect produced by procedural
justice's participatory process. Procedural justice demonstrates that an
authority can most effectively ensure that a regulatory subject complies
with the authority's directives by providing space, during some
interaction between the authority and the civilian, for that civilian to

("Procedural justice is commonly defined in terms of four issues: voice; neutrality; respect; and
trustworthiness. The first two are concerned with how decisions are made and involve voice; the

second two involve the fairness in which people are treated by authorities.") (internal citations
omitted).
". See, e.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL

JUSTICE 9 (1988) ("[P]eople react more favorably to procedures that give them considerable
freedom in communicating their views and arguments."); see also WALKER, supra note 23, at 317

("Procedural justice research holds that people are more likely to feel that the system is fair if they
are informed about what is going on and have a chance to participate in the process. The ability to
tell your side of the story is referred to as having a 'voice' in the process.").
327 Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional
Legitimacy, 4 POLICING
203, 205 (2010). The sense of "moral" used here is perhaps better captured in the idea of "shared
values or of 'moral alignment,"' id., in which what is at stake is not absolute right and wrong, but
rather the opinions or beliefs of the various individuals or social groups comprising the
community. Another way of capturing the concept is as the positive morality of the community.
See generally Sunshine & Tyler, Moral Solidarity, supranote 308.
328
E. Allen Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of
ProceduralJustice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 768 (1997).
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tell her side of the story to the authority. The ideal structure for this
sort of participatory interaction would afford the civilian an
opportunity to make herself heard by some official through a formal or
informal process, for example, by "giving individuals [a] 'voice' during
encounters." 329 Even better, the official should demonstrate respect for
the individual's concerns, 330 and seek other information about the
underlying circumstances so that the official's decision appears
informed by the contextually relevant factors. 33 1
the
emphasizes
requirement
voice
justice's
Procedural
332
participatory structure of procedural justice:
[W]hen making judgments regarding the legitimacy of state
care a great deal about being able to
authorities, people . .
participate in official decisions, being listened to, and having
their views considered by authorities.

. .

. Perhaps the most

important facet of socially grounded procedural justice is quality
of treatment. People desire to be treated politely and with
dignity.333
Procedural justice's participative aspects produce distinctive
psychological effects. Allowing regulatory subjects to tell their side of
the story increases perceptions of fairness and credit-worthiness, even
if participation did not influence the eventual decision. Indeed, so
important is the ability to voice one's concerns to an official that
"studies of voice suggested that having the opportunity for 'voice' had
interpersonal or 'value-expressive' worth that was not linked to any
. [and] even if they knew that what
they said had little or no influence on the decisions made." 33 4 This
influence over the decisions made .

329

.

See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 8, at 7.

Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to
Legal Authorities, 25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 983, 990 (2000).
3'
Tom R. Tyler, EnhancingPolice Legitimacy, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 84, 92
330

(2004).
332
See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 204, at 617 ("In terms of decision making, procedural
justice involves voice-the opportunity to explain one's concerns, actions, or situation-and
factuality/neutrality-evidence that decisions are being made based on facts and without
partiality. The quality of the treatment that people feel they receive is shaped by respect, courtesy,
and dignity and a belief that the motives of the authority are trustworthy.").
333 Benjamin Justice & Tracey L. Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens,
651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 159, 166 (2014); see also Meares, supra note 204, at 347
("[P]articipation is an important element. People report higher levels of satisfaction in encounters
with authorities when they have an opportunity to explain their situation and perspective on
it.... [P]eople care a great deal about how they are treated by organization leaders. Specifically,
people desire to be treated with dignity, with respect for their rights, and with politeness.")
(internal citations omitted).
334
Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice,
Social Identity, and Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCH. REV. 349, 351 (2003)
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legitimacy effect occurred even if participation occurred after the
authority had made its decision. 335
The psychological effects of participation can have major
consequences for law-abiding behavior. Participation "draw[s] on
people's feelings of responsibility and obligation[,]" 3 3 6 increasing the
likelihood that they will engage in activities such as following
instructions, obeying the law, 337 acceding to requests, 338 and the like.
All of these responses have in common that the individual complies
with the official's decision and acts as directed rather than resisting the
official by doing something other than acting as directed (including
doing nothing). In the terms often used by procedural justice scholars, a
person complies with an official directive by "defer[ring]" to the
official,3 39 or "consenting" to their exercise of authority, 340 or otherwise
"empowering" the police. 34 1 Compliance is often contrasted with
disobedience, 342 or resistance, or public disorder. 343
Procedural justice thus offers a theory of police encounters that
provides police officers with incentives to reduce their use of force. 344
Forcible policing is inefficient. 345 It "rel[ies] . . . on threats, coercion, and
force to gain or maintain control during encounters with citizens." 346
Forcible policing is resource-intensive: "it is difficult to gain compliance
solely via the threat use of force." 3 4 7 Rather than focusing on external
factors, it would be more effective, procedural justice advocates argue,

(internal citations omitted).
.

33

Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 331,
at 88.
Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of
Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active Gun Offenders, 102 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397,
403 (2012).
* Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 331, at 92 (quoting JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY,
316

POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND PROCEDURALLY JUST TACTICS 91 (2003)).
3
Tom R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Identity and Deference to the Law: What Shapes RuleFollowing in a Period of Transition?, 61 AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL. 32, 32, 33 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler,

ProceduralJustice, Identity and Deference to the Law].
340

TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at xiv.

Jonathan Jackson et al., Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes
Toward the Acceptability of Violence, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 479, 480 (2013).
342
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 331, at 85.
341

343

WALKER, supra note 23, at 324 (suggesting procedural justice and de-escalation techniques
can work together to reduce forcible encounters).
4 See, e.g., Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295, at 494-95.
Id. at 490.
Tyler, Enhancing Police Legitimacy, supra note 331, at 85 (emphasis added); see also Tom
R. Tyler, ProceduralJustice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 323
(2003) ("[W]hile deterrence influences law-related behavior, the social context of democratic
societies makes it difficult for authorities to engage in the levels of surveillance needed to sustain
a viable legal system simply based upon deterrence.").
3
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to induce the public to internalize deference to police authority. The
psychological strategies recommended by procedural justice thus
produce efficient policing, in that they do not require costly
enforcement mechanisms to induce compliance. Thanks to participative
policing strategies, people choose to obey the police, rather than have
the police employ some kind of (physical) coercion to enforce their
directives. And people choose to obey the police because they believe
that the police respect or include them when engaged in the decisionmaking process.
Citizens who obey the law out of respect for it-rather than
merely out of fear of being caught and punished for
wrongdoing-self-regulate and thereby enhance public safety,
bolster police effectiveness by freeing officers to focus on serious
problems, and pose less of a threat to individual officers during
face-to-face contacts. 348
An explicit advantage of procedural justice over other forms of
policing, then, is compliance-based incentives that undercut "[t]he
instinctive preference of the cop on the beat using the tough approach
to policing style." 34 9 Procedural justice advocates argue that, "the police
ought to be trained to act in ways the public experiences as being just
and encouraged to do so during personal encounters with members of
the public." 350 Procedural justice thus promotes, not merely effective,
but civilized policing in which the police eschew "an aggressive style
that subordinates

individual rights . ..

[and

embraces]

something

closer to its opposite-practices that can be grouped under the heading
of proceduraljustice."351
Beyond compliance, individuals may be willing to cooperate with
the police and other public officials. 352 Cooperation, at the very least,
entails deferring to rules, instructions, or requests. 353 But the sense of

Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295, at 494 (citation omitted).
Schulhofer et al., supra note 303, at 343.
Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 298, at 242.
'
311 Schulhofer et al., American Policingat a Crossroads,supra note 303, at 345.
352 One way of separating out the concepts of cooperation and compliance is to suggest that
people cooperate with some organization or individual, whereas people comply with rules or
norms. See, e.g., Gau, Convergent and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295, at 490
("[C]ompliance comprises two domains: cooperation with police and compliance with the law in
general."). There is, however, some "overlap" between these two concepts. Tyler & Fagan,
Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 298, at 247 ("[C]ompliance with the law and cooperation
with the police [are both types of cooperation]. Conceptually, there is some overlap in these
constructs and items are likely to be internally correlated.").
348

349

"1
See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 4 (2013) ("Mandated cooperation occurs when

people engage in behavior that is dictated or required by group rules or norms. Some rule or policy
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cooperation most differentiated from mere compliance 354 involves
individuals, without the prompting of mandatory rules or directives,
volunteering some form of assistance or "helping behavior or proactive
social behavior."3 5 5 Most often, such assistance is directed toward those
people the helper tends to perceive as a member of the same group,
sharing the same goals and values. 356 In the context of policing, this
sort of discretionary, voluntary cooperation "takes several forms, from
reporting crimes to the police to assisting the police in
investigations." 3 5 7
One important exogenous fact might be the social morality of the
people policed. That is, the factors producing cooperation and
compliance depend upon the values that civilians independently hold or
endorse, rather than the way they are treated during the encounter.
Indeed, more recent procedural justice studies have disambiguated
compliance and cooperation and found that cooperation-promoting
pro-social group activity-depends upon individuals "trusting" others
as sharing social values or social morality, whereas compliance is
linked through legitimacy to issues of interpersonal fairness or
justice. 358 Cooperation appears closely tied to the belief that the police
officer (or other government official) is supporting and defending
community norms, whereas compliance depends upon the belief that
the government official is treating the civilian with respect by giving
the civilian the opportunity to participate in and influence the
process. 359
However, the picture is more complex than it might at first appear.
Social morality is not only an exogenous feature of some group or
community: it can be accommodated within the encounter process by
the way in which the officer extends or withholds respect from the

of the group prescribes the terms and guidelines of the behavior."); Tyler, Procedural Justice,
Identity and Deference to the Law, supra note 339, at 32 (stating one form of cooperation is

deference to rules).
354

Tyler and Blader call this kind of cooperation "discretionary." See TYLER & BLADER, supra

note 353, at 4-5.
Id. at 3.
3
Id. at 4-6.
3
Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 298, at 236; see also JONATHAN
JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY?: TRUST IN THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 187 (2012)

(advocating cooperation as taking action to "call the police, to report crime or suspicious activities,
to provide information to help police identify a criminal[I"); see also Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does
the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing,
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLICY, & L. 419 (2011).
5 TYLER & HUO, supra note 299, at 95-96.
3
See, e.g., Ben Bradford et al., Officers as Mirrors, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 527, 529-30
(2014) (discussing importance for procedural justice of treating individuals with dignity and
respect).
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civilian.3 60 If the official indicates that she embraces the civilian's
values as her own-that civilian and official are part of a group that
share and promote the same values-then the civilian is more likely to
trust and cooperate with the official. 361 In this way, social morality may
be transformed from an exogenous into an endogenous part of the
encounter process by the officer's actions and demeanor during her
interactions with the civilian. 362
One famous example of internalizing shared values as part of the
encounter process is the "Christian burial speech" discussed in Brewer
v. Williams.363 Williams was arrested as a suspect in the abduction of a
ten-year-old girl. After asserting his right to a lawyer, the two police
officers tasked with transporting him to their precinct agreed with his
lawyer (who was waiting for Williams at the police station) not to
question Williams during the trip.
Detective Leaming [one of the officers] knew that Williams was
a former mental patient, and knew also that he was deeply
religious. The detective and his prisoner soon embarked on a
wide-ranging conversation covering a variety of topics, including
the subject of religion. Then, . . . Detective Leaming delivered
what has been referred to in the briefs and oral arguments as
the "Christian burial speech." Addressing Williams as
"Reverend," the detective said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're
traveling down the road.... Number one, I want you to
observe the weather conditions . . . They are predicting several
inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the
only person that knows where this little girl's body is . . . and
if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to
find it. And . . . I feel that . . . the parents of this little girl
should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who
was snatched away from them on Christmas (E)ve and
murdered. And I feel we should stop and locate it on the way
in rather than waiting until morning and trying to come back

Id.; Sunshine & Tyler, Moral Solidarity, supra note 308, at 162.
See, e.g., Gau, The Convergent and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295, at 495
("[P]rocedural justice predicts police legitimacy, which in turn affects cooperation and compliance.
Procedural justice and police legitimacy are subjective, psychological judgments about perceived
fairness.").
162 Tyler et al., Object of Suspicion, supra note 204, at 617; Benjamin Justice & Tracey L.
Meares, How the Criminal Justice System Educates Citizens, 651 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
SCI. 159, 166 (2014); see also Meares, supra note 204, at 347.
0

361

363 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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out after a snow storm and possibly not being able to find it at
all.364

Officer Leaming later acknowledged
that he employed
psychological techniques to induce Williams to talk. 3 65 These techniques
certainly worked: he did get Williams to volunteer to cooperate. 366 And
Officer Leaming did so, not by browbeating Williams, but by
establishing that he and Williams shared the same values, and had the
same goals. Having established a sense of "solidarity"3 67 through their
membership in the same religious community, Williams apparently
trusted Officer Leaming so much that he volunteered the location of the
girl. But as a matter of constitutional law, and as a matter of fact,
Officer Leaming's sociable invitation to talk undermined Williams's
interest in maintaining his innocence. 368
The Christian Burial Speech exposes a tension at the heart of
procedural justice between its participative structure and some of its
anti-authoritarian claims. Procedural justice describes a type of
psychological power: the officials' ability to induce a psychological
effect, such that individuals regard public officials as credit-worthy and
accept the official's directives as entitled to deference. The theory
identifies a particularly efficient way to induce compliance or
cooperation: it is not concerned with whether those directives are
lawful, and thus whether the individual legally ought to comply or
cooperate. Instead, the police may direct techniques-like Officer
Leaming's
Christian Burial
Speech-toward
overcoming the
constitutionally protected resistance of civilians targeted by the police.
C.

A Legitimacy Gap?

Procedural justice invites us to draw a variety of political and
moral conclusions from its findings about police-civilian interactions.

3

Id. at 392-93.

365

Yale Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: What Is 'Interrogation?When

Does It Matter?, 67 GEO. L. REV. 1, 1 (1978) (quoting Lamberto, Learning's "Speech". "I'd Dolit
Again, "DES MOINES REGISTER, Apr. 7, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1).
366
The Brewer Court held that Officer Leaming's actions violated Brewer's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Id. at 400-01.
367 Bradford et al., Officers as Mirrors, supra
note 359, at 529.
368 The police also found some exculpatory evidence suggesting that Williams did not murder
the girl. See, e.g., Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)
("The defense conceded that Williams had left the YMCA with the little girl's body, but claimed
that someone else had killed her and placed her body in Williams's room in the hope that suspicion
would focus on him. Williams, the theory went, then panicked, fled, and hid the body by the side of
a road, until he came to his senses and gave himself up two days later. The theory is not so farfetched as it sounds."). I am grateful to Professor Alice Ristroph for reminding me that questions
surrounded Williams's guilt.
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Two features in particular, trust and legitimacy, dominate discussions
of procedural justice. 369 Trust and legitimacy are important to explain
the authority of law and legal officials: "[T]o be effective, legal rules and
decisions must be obeyed." 3 7 0 Procedural justice argues that
internalized feelings of trust and legitimacy are more potent and longer
lasting than external incentives or punishments in producing
compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities.3 7 1
Legitimacy is, however, a slippery concept. 372 It has a number of
distinct meanings. Normative legitimacy is, at bottom, a moral and
political concept. 373 It entails that the authority has a (moral) right to
issue directives or regulate conduct. 374 Legal legitimacy is a species of
normative legitimacy. 375 Legal legitimacy requires that authority be
exercised according to legally valid rules. 3 7 6 For example, a police
officer's authority is normatively legitimate only if it is lawful. And a
police officer's authority is lawful only if some law exists that supports
her claim to authority. Sociological or psychological legitimacy refers to
the attitudes people take toward authorities. 3 7 7 For example, a police
officer's authority is sociologically or psychologically legitimate based on
369

See, e.g., JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., supra note 357, at 1 ("This book is an investigation

into the psychological and sociological mechanisms driving public trust, police legitimacy and the
willingness of citizens to cooperate with police officers."); see generally TYLER & HUO, supra note
299; Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A ProactiveModel of Social Regulation, 81 B.U. L.
REV. 361, 378 (2001) (arguing authorities can gain trust by acting in legitimate, procedurally fair
ways).
370 Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CINN. L. REV. 847,
856 (1998); see also Tyler, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 298, at 16 (discussing
compliance with rules and orders as essential for effective authority); Mike Hough et al., supra
note 327.
37

See generally TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 298; TYLER & HUO, supra

note 299.
372

See, e.g., DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 34 (2d ed. 2013) (describing

differences between the legal, philosophical, and sociological meanings of "legitimacy").
11
Id. at 4-5.
374
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 3-4 (2009)
(describing legitimate authority as resting upon moral reasons).
376
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Claims of Law, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 28-33 (2009) (arguing
that law must claim legitimate authority); John Gardner, How Law Claims, What Law Claims, in
LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH 143 (2012) (same).
376

See, e.g., DAVID BEETHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER, supra note 372.

Id. (providing a hermeneutic account of legitimacy such that an authority is legitimate if it
can be justified in terms of some group's beliefs, that is, the values and standards they, as a group,
accept). Beetham's view is a modified version of Weber's claim that authority depends upon a
belief in the authority's right to rule. See, e.g., 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 31-36, 21216 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. 1978) (discussing the concept of legitimacy). Procedural
justice theorists' view of legitimacy importantly endorses the sociological, rather than normative
version of legitimacy. See, e.g., JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., supra note 357, at 213 (discussing
Beetham's view); Tyler & Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation, supra note 298, at 235 nn.13-15
(2008) (endorsing Beetham and Weber); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the
Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 307-08 (2003) (endorsing Weber's view); Tyler,
EnhancingPolice Legitimacy, supranote 331, at 87 (2004) (endorsing Weber's view).
17
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the policed person's perception that the authority is credit-worthy and
entitled to order the civilian about (whether or not some law exists that
really does confer legal authority upon that officer).
Democratic legitimacy provides yet another distinctive meaning of
legitimacy for our lexicon. Democracy requires, not only participation,
but also responsiveness to the interests of the members of the
democracy. So a democratically legitimate authority not only allows its
subjects to participate in the decision-making process, but is genuinely
contestatory-thatis, actually responsive to their interests.
Procedural justice is primarily a theory about sociological and
psychological credit-worthiness: how people feel about authorities. It is
not, primarily, a theory about normative or democratic legitimacy:
whether the authority's actions are justified or lawful or responsive.
Nonetheless, recent procedural justice theory goes beyond drawing
sociological or psychological conclusions about the effects of authorities'
conduct upon compliance or cooperation, to argue that the theory
entails
some
important
democracy-promoting
effects.37 8
This
democracy-promoting version of procedural justice claims to address
multiple aspects of the democracy model: procedural justice is
participative and this participative aspect is supposedly antiauthoritarian (or anti-elitist), seeking to include individuals in the
decision-making process and disperse decision-making power between
government officials and civilians.379
For example, some procedural justice theorists claim their
practices promote community engagement in policing, creating a "bond
between the police and the public." 38 0 Emphasizing participation and
social solidarity, the theory is supposed to promote "shared authority
based on social connectedness," 381 and, ultimately, the democratically
admirable goal of "policing by consent." 382 The effect produced by
procedural justice, these proponents claim, increases the chances that
the public gets "a police force that is legitimate, just, effective and
restrained in its use of power. [In turn], the police depend upon trust,
legitimacy, and the cooperation of the public to function in an effective
and fair manner." 383

3
The relationship between procedural justice and democracy is most forcefully articulated
by Tracey Meares. See, e.g., Justice & Meares, How the CriminalJustice System Educates Citizens,
supra note 362.
3
Tyler, Procedural Justice, Identity and Deference to the Law, supra note 339, at 32
(discussing centrality of "procedural justice . . to people's relationships to hierarchical groups.").

`

"
3
3

JACKSON ET AL., supra note 357, at 7.

Id. at 610.
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But is the procedural justice effect one of full-blown normative or
democratic legitimacy, or only of psychological credit-worthiness?
Normative legitimacy requires that the processes are (morally or
politically) fair or just or lawful, not apparently fair or just or lawful.
Contestatory democracy also requires the process to be reciprocal, not
unilateral. Participation, as we have seen, is not enough to prevent
unilateral domination of the process by some regulatory authority. The
process must also ensure that the authority is required to respect the
civilian's reasons or interests by acting upon them.
Procedural justice is poorly equipped to account for this sort of
responsiveness. That is because procedural justice has a particular
direction of influence. Structurally, influence flows from superior to
inferior, and from inside the police organization to outside (influence
flows down and out), but the procedural justice model does not require
that it flow the other way (in and up). Civilians may participate in
official decision-making by voicing their concerns, but the structure of
procedural justice does not guarantee that the official will internalize
those concerns and treat them as reasons to be accounted for in making
her ultimate decision. Instead, the decision-maker may unilaterally
externalize the civilian's expressions of concern-that is, discount them
as non-obligatory reasons which need not factor into determining the
outcome of the interaction-while at the same time sympathetically
communicating a shared sense of value, and manifesting the hallmarks
(if not the actuality) of benevolence.
There is thus a potential gap between a civilian's psychological
feelings of obligation and credit-worthiness toward the officer or the
law, and the actual lawfulness of police directives or the actual
normative or democratic validity of the law. And the state can-and
sometimes does-exploit these feelings of credit-worthiness to its
benefit-for example, by inducing civilians to comply or consent to
officials' immoral, illegal, or anti-democratic directives when the
civilian otherwise would not. That is not news to proponents of
procedural justice who recognize that "it is possible to have a system of
governance that commands high levels of perceived legitimacy from the
governed whilst also, paradoxically, failing to meet the criteria of
384
legitimacy that political philosophers would generally accept."

This legitimacy gap can exist not only between the police
organization and the community, but also between individuals within
the police organization and members of the public. And the legitimacy
gap is at its widest, not primarily when the practice of procedural
justice goes wrong, but when it goes well. The legitimacy gap is at its

384

Mike Hough et al., supra note 327, at 204.
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most powerful when police expressions of sympathy and opportunities
to participate, though to all appearances sincere, are a sham
unilaterally designed to encourage the civilian to comply or cooperate
with a remote, centralized, elite organization or officer.
The central problem raised by normatively loaded terms like
"justice" and "legitimacy" is that, when people consent to just or
legitimate procedures, they consent, not to fair-looking procedures, but
to procedures that are actually fair or actually just. If a procedure is
(normativity, politically, or democratically) unjust or unfair, then
appearances to the contrary will not save the procedure from being
unfair in fact. Injustice (or unfairness) is primarily a normative (moral,
political, or democratic) concept. Much of the ink spilt in moral,
political, and democratic theory-to say nothing of legal theory and
criminal procedure-has sought to separate the seemingly fair from the
truly fair. And one core case of unfairness arises when a more powerful
individual or group (such as the police) seeks, unilaterally, to impose its
subjective interests upon others.
To the extent that procedural justice has a normative message, it is
only in conjunction with the evaluative judgment that compliance is
legally (or politically or morally) valuable. But that evaluative
judgment cannot be generalized across all the occasions upon which
public officials deploy compliance-inducing strategies. Whether the
strategy is valuable or not depends in part upon whether the official is
justified in demanding compliance: whether she has the legal authority
and moral right to do so.
Procedural justice works most smoothly when the authority's
interests are aligned with the civilian's. The power of procedurally just
strategies of compliance and cooperation appears straightforward when
civilians have no choice but to comply with determinate, mandatory
norms that are also morally, politically, and legally valid. In such cases,
there is no question but that civilians ought to comply with such norms
and the power of procedural justice aligns with the interests of the
civilians and the community.
Matters are more complicated when the norms are not morally and
politically valid, or not legally valid, or when the civilian does have a
choice. On these occasions, it may be (legally, morally, or politically)
better (for the individual or for the community) that the individual
question or even resist complying with the official. In those cases, the
official ought to cease her quest for compliance (whether she seeks to
induce acceptance through procedural justice techniques, physical and
normative sanctions, or some combination of these approaches). In such
cases, the power to induce the public to comply or cooperate may
conflict with lawfulness, morality, or some choice that the civilian

360
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might autonomously prefer were she left to her own devices (i.e.,
independent of the authority's intervention).
The law often delegates discretion to the civilian and empowers her
to decide what to do. It does so in the context of the encounter and of
the interrogation, where civilians have the power to walk away or
engage with an officer; to consent or decline to consent to a search; to
speak or remain silent; and to ask for a lawyer or speak without one.
These (and other choices that the law may delegate to individuals more
generally) are each important forms of liberty. However, the civilian's
choices may conflict with some legal authority's interests. In that case,
the authority's strategic actions may override or undermine the
civilian's ability to choose and thus disempower her.
These gaps-between perception and lawfulness, perception and
democracy, and perception and autonomy-suggest different ways in
which procedurally just power may undermine rather than enhance our
ability to do the right thing. Instead, procedural justice identifies one
way in which authoritiesgain the ability to induce us to do their thing:
whatever it is that the authority wants us to do. And the authority
need not act in an expressly coercive or threatening manner-so
procedural justice reveals-in order to induce the civilian to comply or
cooperate. The civilian's decision to comply or cooperate may not even
be a conscious one. The civilian may even alter her stories about the
encounter to explain her participation as self-motivated and freely
chosen-rather than induced, heteronomously, by the psychological
strategies of some authority. These revised and inaccurate explanations
can have significant impacts down the road, when trying to suppress or
exclude the evidentiary fruits of the encounter or interrogation.
All of this is to suggest that procedural justice is a powerful theory
exposing the gains and losses produced by participative political
structures. Procedural justice tends to emphasize the gains: the
participative structure makes room for the subjects of regulation to tell
their story and give their input; that the authorities treat their
subordinates with respect and beneficence; that these strategies
produce a sense of obligation toward and increase trust in the
authorities; and that the outcome is increased compliance and
cooperation with authorities both locally and globally.
D.

Interactive Structure

The compliance and cooperation effects of procedural justice
depend upon the psychological impact an authority makes, through her
conduct or demeanor, upon some subject of regulation. The power of the
procedural justice model is that the structure of the interaction-the
four-factor process of voice, neutrality, respect, and beneficence-
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produces the compliance and cooperation effects. This structure, I have
suggested, is unilateral rather than reciprocal, so that the police need
not respond to civilians' interests even when engaged in a procedurally
just encounter. These effects do not depend upon the subjective
motivation of the authority: they can be produced sincerely or
insincerely (as well as intentionally or unintentionally). Motivation is,
after all, an exogenous factor, much like lawfulness, and thus
independent of the process employed during the interaction. Therefore,
even if an authority insincerely uses procedural justice strategies to
trick a participant into complying with her directives, "[f]rom a
procedural justice standpoint, the . . . tricke[d] [participant] has no
complaint about voice or opportunity to be heard." 385 Her voice was
heard; the authority discounted it.
The gap between the perception and the existence of lawful
authority-that is, between psychological and normative legitimacymay be readily manipulated by psychologically sophisticated police.
officers. Officer Leaming well understood this aspect of policing.
Reminiscing about his "Christian Burial Speech" nine years later, he
gloated:
Shucks, I was just being a good old-fashioned cop, the only kind
I know how to be....
I have never seen a prisoner physically abused, though I heard
about those things in the early days....
That type of questioning just doesn't work. They'll just resist
harder.
You have to butter 'em up, sweet talk 'em, use that-what's the
word?-"psychological coercion." 386
The compliance and cooperation effects also-in the short term at
least, and perhaps even in the long term 38 7-do
not depend upon
reciprocal influence between the authority and the subject of
regulation. The effect is produced so long as the subject of regulation
perceives the interaction as participative and respectful whether it is or
not. It is the authority's participative effort that is reciprocated by
compliance, not the outcome of the process. 388 The compliance and

a Rebecca E. Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of ProceduralJustice in the Federal Courts,
63 HASTINGs L.J. 127, 150-51 (2011).
'

Kamisar, supra note 365.

3
David De Cremer & Tom R. Tyler, The Effects of Trust in Authority and Procedural
Fairnesson Cooperation,92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 639, 640 (2007).
3
Id.
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cooperation effects are independent of outcomes. An authority produces
the compliance effect when that authority (sincerely or insincerely)
makes space for participation and (sincerely or insincerely) displays an
attitude of respect, independent of whether her ultimate decision
accords with anything voiced by the civilian during the interaction. The
direction of influence intrinsic to the model, remember, is hierarchical
and one-directional, from the authority to the subject of regulation.
There is a tension at the heart of procedural justice between its
participative structure and some of its anti-authoritarian claims.
Procedural justice describes a type of psychological power: the officials'
ability to induce a psychological effect, such that individuals regard
public officials as credit-worthy and accept the official's directives as
entitled to deference. The theory identifies a particularly efficient way
to induce compliance or cooperation: it is not concerned with whether
those directives are lawful, and thus whether the individual legally
ought to comply or cooperate.
Low- or medium-level trickery, of the used car salesman sort, is,
however, an everyday part of the process of policing. Jerome Skolnick
suggests that trickery and deception are endemic to the police role.
The police subculture-the workaday normative order of
police-permits, and sometimes demands, deception of courts,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants[.] . . . Police ...
work within a severe, but often agonizingly contradictory, moral
order which demands certain kinds of fidelities and insists upon
other kinds of betrayals. The police milieu is normatively
contradictory, almost to the point of being schizophrenogenic.
Norms regarding deception, written and implied, abound in this
moral order. 389
Many of these deceptions receive legal and public sanction,
390
In such
"vary[ing] inversely with the level of the criminal process."
trickery.
tolerating
cases, solidarity with policing may entail
Where authorities can manipulate subordinates through a
participative structure, the very gains identified by procedural justicecompliance and cooperation-turn out (also) to be losses. Procedural
justice expresses one way in which authoritarian individuals or
organizations can dominate civilians: the direction of influence
identified by procedural justice is hierarchically structured; it operates
from the authority to the civilian and not the other way round. The
question, then, is whether authorities, i.e., police officers, government

3"
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Skolnick, Deception by Police, supra note 185, at 41.
Skolnick & Leo, supra note 185, at 3.
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officials, employment supervisors, and so on, are able to consistently
engage in "impression management strategy[ies]" that discount or
ignore the voice of their subordinates, 3 9 1 or whether there is something
structurally fragile about "an authority structure that tolerates,
condones, or even encourages parties to trick [or otherwise disregard]
one another [so that the authority structure] is not likely to induce
feelings of trust in its participants." 392
One possibility is that, if the authority's conduct or demeanor
reveals that she is not to be trusted, then the participant simply will
not cooperate or comply. 3 9 3 Structurally, if the participant "realize[s]
that the use of voice is simply an impression management tactic,"394
that lack of beneficence or respect will undermine the compliance effect
in catastrophic ways. 39 5 The issue of pretext and lack of reciprocity has
become a pressing issue in the psychology of traffic stops: a recent
study argued that the sort of considerate treatment characteristic of
procedurally just policing strategies were insufficient to induce feelings
of trust or obligation. 396 Instead exogenous contextual features
indicating whether the civilian was policed based on her race proved
decisive for civilian assessments of fairness. 397 However, the procedural
justice point is that exogenous factors may be incorporated into the
interaction through conduct or demeanor. Where an officer treats a
civilian suspiciously, and thus excludes the civilian from the sort of
esteem appropriate to a fellow member of the authority's peer group,
such treatment proves decisive in undermining the feelings of respect
and beneficence that turn out to be particularly salient in these
historically tainted interactions. 3 9 8
There are many ways in which authorities are most likely to
incorporate conduct or demeanor expressive of distrust or disrespect.
Authorities may expressly denigrate those whom they regulate: the
police officer on the street may be openly racist. But insincerity
addresses a different set of circumstances; ones in which authorities
seek (consciously or unconsciously) to mask or minimize the lack of
reciprocity during the interaction. Such obvious acts of disrespect
would be at odds with that goal.

391

39

Id.
Rebecca E. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 385, at 151.
De Cremer & Tyler, supra note 387, at 640.

394

id.

3

Meares, supra note 204, at 347; Tyler, Object of Suspicion, supra note 204, at 626-27.

396

EPP ET AL., supra note 33, at 6.

Id. at 134-51 (discussing the race-based harms of police investigatory stops that are
implied by, but not fully captured by, the theory of procedural justice).
3 See generally Tyler et al., Object of Suspicion, supra note 204.
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One way an insincere authority may undermine a respectful or
trustworthy demeanor is when the authority is self-conscious about the
399
People often find it
unfairness or lack of parity in the procedure.
difficult to consistently maintain the appearance of a fair process when
they know that the process is not, in fact fair. Once again, the idea is
that there is some mechanism by which the authority incorporates
exogenous factors into the interaction, making the subject of regulation
aware of her subordinate status as excluded from the group.
If, however, the authority's demeanor or other conduct consistently
manifests respect and courtesy-by "communicat[ing] that one can
exert some control over the decision and that one's input is valued and
respected by the authority"400-then the internal, endogenous check on
domination-by-trickery remains absent. Unless the civilian discovers
her lack of influence upon the authority during the interaction, it will
be exogenous factors-outcomes-that demonstrate her impotence. The
individual sees that the outcomes are consistently adverse to her input,
and so comes to believe that she is unable to influence the authority's
decision. Given that outcomes have much less effect on participant
perceptions of legitimacy and trustworthiness, endogenous factors
indicating trustworthiness and respect are likely to have (on the
theory's own terms) a much greater impact, which may explain why it
takes so long ("eventually") 40 1 for the effect to become manifest.
A further problem is that, for one-off interactions or for timelimited relationships, there may be little opportunity to discover that
the authority is unresponsive. There are just too few interactions to
determine influence or lack thereof. Many of the interactions between
the public and some government official (including the police) are oneoff in this way. Encounters and especially interrogations need not
feature repeat-player civilians. In this way, relations between the police
and public need not be like those between, for example, employer and
4 02
The
employee, which are likely to have repeat players on both sides.
mendacious
discipline that repetitive interactions imposes upon
authorities is thus absent from the sort of isolated interactions
characteristic of encounters between police and public.
Another difference is that, unlike the employment domain, police
authorities are trained to manifest respect, beneficence, and neutrality

. Jerald Greenberg, Looking Fair Versus Being Fair: Managing Impressions of
OrganizationalJustice, 12 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 111, 124-25 (1990).
400
De Cremer & Tyler, supra note 387, at 647.
401
Id. at 640.
402
Id. (finding that "information about the degree of trustworthiness of the authority
moderates procedural fairness effects on people's willingness to cooperate").
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during interrogations, and often during encounters. 403 Where an
employee's supervisor may lack any special training in controlling her
demeanor, a police interrogator is precisely trained to present a certain
appearance of solidarity and respect toward the suspect. 404
Furthermore, officers expressly internalize deception as part of the
"game." 405 Thus, interrogators, and perhaps other police officers, are
more immune to the effects of self-consciousness than other actors,
even over the long term.
But the deeper problem is that the structure of psychological
influence is hierarchical and unilateral, and thus mostly independent of
reciprocity (that is, official responsiveness to the regulatory subject's
input). Once again, all that matters is that the authority acts as if the
regulatory subject has influenced her decision, rather than in fact take
the civilian's participation seriously.
For example, the effect of Officer Leaming's Christian Burial
Speech in Brewer v. Williams was explicable and even predictable
because Leaming's speech drew on many of procedural justice's
psychological tools: the defendant was given the opportunity to
participate in the process and tell his side of the story by an authority
who appeared neutral or even, beneficently, to take the defendant's side
as a member of the same moral and religious community, who treated
him with dignity and respect. Here, the defendant's confession was the
result of "a causal model in which procedural fairness causes moral
solidarity, and moral solidarity causes cooperation and compliance." 4 0 6
These techniques-participation, solidarity, and so on-were not
something Officer Leaming just pulled out of a hat. They are part of the
tactics that officers are trained to have in their arsenal of social control
methods. Indeed, they are most closely associated with some of the
interrogation techniques-often called the "Reid" method, after the
person who popularized them 407-identified by Professor Richard Leo 40 8
and the Miranda Court 409 before him, as widespread throughout the
police community. The Reid method has been commonplace in
403
Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 270-72, 275; Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and
Trickery, supra note 185, at 785-86 (describing police trained to lie during interrogation).
404
Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 270-72, 275; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 215, at
988.
4
Leo, Miranda's Revenge, supra note 219, at 270-72, 275.
406 Sunshine & Tyler, Moral Solidarity, supra note 308, at 162; see also Gau, The Convergent
and Discriminant Validity, supra note 295, at 496 ('Trocedural justice predicted perceived
obligation to obey, and obligation to obey was significantly and positively related to cooperation
and compliance.").

407

See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed., 1986).

408

See, e.g., Ofshe & Leo, supra note 215, at 987.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.

409

REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (1962)).
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contemporary police training for over fifty years, and its use appears to
extend beyond the interrogation context into the practice of obtaining
10
consent to search from suspects on the street or in their cars.4
The Reid method demonstrates the power of psychological
strategies to induce compliance and cooperation."11 It instructs the
police, at important stages during the interrogation process, to avoid
"tak[ing] a hostile tone []or tell[ing] the individual that he is a suspect.
Instead, [the officer's are to] treat him respectfully and are likely to say
they need his help in solving the crime."4 12 Beneficence, respect,
neutrality, and participation are all important parts of the
interrogation method. The officer, at specific stages of the interrogation,
is supposed precisely to function as a mirror expressing a positive
"'image in the looking glass' . . . generating feelings of pride and selfvalue that encourages them to identify with the group, legitimize its
structures of authority, comply with its rules and cooperate within and
on its behalf."4 13 The Reid method trades on these officer-induced
psychological feelings of solidarity:
To the extent that the investigator is able to conduct the
interrogation in an interaction style appropriate for two people
working on a problem-solving task, he facilitates the suspect's
decision to say "I did it" and his subsequent confession. It is far
easier to admit wrongdoing to someone who appears to be a
sympathetic acquaintance, if not a friend.414
The experience of police practice to elicit confessions or consent is
not that the police lack training in procedural justice: certain police
officers have been heavily trained in psychological procedures identical
or akin to procedural justice for over fifty years. That experience
suggests that the police, intent on securing compliance from the public,
will use compliance-inducing techniques similar to procedural justice in
ways that undermine individual autonomy, and which may even put
the integrity of the criminal justice system at risk.
The core problem is that participation is not enough to undermine
the sort of psychological power that hierarchical authorities may wield
over their regulatory subjects. The lesson from the history of criminal
procedure is that participation can empower authorities in ways that
are democratically or doctrinally disturbing. Revealing these operations
See EPP ET AL., supra note 33, at 36-40 (discussing a training manual for making
investigatory stops, which includes psychological tactics similar to the Reid method).
411
See, e.g., Skolnick & Leo, supra note 256, at 5-7 (discussing strategies).
412
Ofshe & Leo, supranote 215, at 987.
410

413
414

Ben Bradford et al., Officers as Mirrors,supra note 359, at 529.
Ofshe & Leo, supra note 215, at 988.
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of power can expose the ways in which seemingly neutral or even
beneficent authorities can structure interactions to influence the
outcomes in quite potent ways. Rather than accept authority, the
resistance model of policing acknowledges that it may be, on occasion,
democratically more profound to challenge it. Individuals can still
respect authority while questioning its limits, by, for example,
challenging the police to justify their legal and moral authority when
deciding whether to comply.
From the resistance model's perspective, consensus is not enough
to establish non-domination. After all, procedural justice itself
establishes that consensus may be heteronomous, and produced by
authoritarian influence. Recognizing the hierarchical possibilities of
even fully participative processes, the resistance model helps identify
when state-sponsored interactions fail to include deliberative and
reciprocal guarantees. Deliberation is required to ensure that
authorities do not simply pander to the prejudices of the subjects of
regulation: 415 fears about insecurity, racial prejudices, and the like. And
reciprocity is required to ensure that civilians do influence official
decision-making. To ensure a participative and deliberative process
grounded in reasoning, the resistance model emphasizes reflection,
reconsideration, and reciprocity as essential to non-domination. 4 16
V. CONCLUSION
Psychological techniques to induce compliance are one set of tools
the police use to influence interactions. Psychological compliance
techniques ensure that police preferences dominate when the law
grants civilians a choice of actions. Under the influence of even
procedurally just, that is, inclusive, techniques, individuals may
nonetheless waive their rights or confess to crimes in ways that
undermine not only the civilian's interests, but also the integrity of the
legal system.
These anti-democratic and constitution-undermining effects are
produced by the power of participation to induce a sense of obligation
and even solidarity during encounters and interrogations. The
contribution of procedural justice to policing may be to show the ways
in which this participative power can be manipulated both to promote
law-abidingness among citizens, but also to reinforce hierarchical
relationships between the police and the rest of us.

415

See, e.g., PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM, supra note 250, at 188 (endorsing
the "the ideal of a

republic of reasons"' as a core element of deliberation and democracy).
416
Id. at 195 ("The polity must be deliberative and inclusive, for sure, but
equally clearly it
must also be responsive.").
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The history of policing demonstrates the power and perils of just
these sorts of consent-manipulating techniques. Psychologicallyinduced consent is unilateral: in the hands of the police, these consentand cooperation-inducing techniques can produce anti-democratic and
unconstitutional effects. These effects include unwitting waivers of
constitutional rights or a psychologically-induced inability to question
police authority, even when it is unlawful. And it is precisely because
procedural justice is so empirically successful in producing these effects
that it raises these normative concerns. In addressing the physical
harm of police violence, procedural justice leaves unresolved the other
normative harms that the police may visit on the public.
Exposing the possibility that police will use certain psychological
strategies to dominate civilians evidences the value of encouraging
citizens to resist or not comply. To undermine hierarchy, it is not
enough to be treated with respect or beneficence, or to have a voice in
the process of policing. Instead, civilians must have the right to
challenge the police, to demand that the police justify their
interventions, to ensure that the police acknowledge the sources and
limits of their authority, and to require that the police deescalate and
desist when those limits are reached. Only once the police respect the
democratic and constitutional rights to resist can we can hold the police
accountable for their actions.

